EMOTIONAL COMPETENCE, “RATIONAL UNDERSTANDING,” AND THE
CRIMINAL DEFENDANT
Terry A. Maroney

Abstract
Adjudicative competence, more commonly referred to as competence to stand trial, is a highly
undertheorized area of law. Though it is well established that, to be competent, a criminal
defendant must have a “rational” as well as “factual” understanding of her situation, the
meaning of such “rational understanding” has gone largely undefined. Given the large number
of criminal prosecutions in which competence is at issue, the doctrine’s instability stands in stark
contrast to its importance.
This Article argues that adjudicative competence, properly understood, asks whether a criminal
defendant has capacity to participate meaningfully in the host of decisions potentially required
of her. Further, sound assessment of such capacity requires attention to both the cognitive and
emotional influences on rational decision-making in situations of personal relevance and risk.
The role of emotion has been neglected, both in traditional accounts of decision-making and in
assessments of adjudicative competence, and merits particular attention. This Article explores
two examples of potentially competence-threatening emotional dysfunction—severe psychiatric
mood disorder and organic brain damage—either of which may interfere unreasonably with
decision-relevant emotional perception, processing, and expression. Existing legal theory and
forensic testing methods, which reflect a predominantly cognitive approach, do not account
adequately for such dysfunction. Shifting the adjudicative competence inquiry away from a
general search for “rationality” and toward a more finely-grained examination of the cognitive
and emotional influences on rational decision-making processes offers our best hope for giving
meaning to “rational understanding.”
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Emotional Competence, Rational Understanding, and the Criminal Defendant
Introduction
[C]ognition is not as logical as it was once thought and
emotions are not always so illogical.1
The legal standard for adjudicative competence2 appears simple: as the Supreme Court
declared in Dusky v. United States, the test is whether a criminal defendant “has sufficient
present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding—
and whether he has a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him.”3
This surface clarity, however, disguises a fundamental lack of transparent meaning. A robust
conception of adjudicative competence that gives meaning to the Dusky standard must ask
whether a criminal defendant has the capacity to participate meaningfully in the host of decisions
potentially required of her, and sound assessment of such capacity requires careful attention to
both the cognitive and emotional influences on rational decision-making. To date, no such
theory of Dusky rationality has been adequately articulated, and implementation of the
adjudicative competence construct is commensurately unstable. A decision-making approach,
one that overtly concerns itself with both emotion and cognition, offers a path to both legitimate
and stabilize a confused area of criminal law.
Adjudicative competence is, in many respects, the neglected younger sibling of the
insanity defense, a secondary status that may explain its instability and relatively low profile. Its
jurisprudence has grown up in insanity’s shadow, to the extent that until quite recently it was
referred to as “present insanity.”4 Indeed, in the execution context the language of insanity and

1

JOSEPH LEDOUX, THE EMOTIONAL BRAIN: THE MYSTERIOUS UNDERPINNINGS OF EMOTIONAL LIFE 35 (1996).
See NORMAN G. POYTHRESS ET AL., ADJUDICATIVE COMPETENCE: THE MACARTHUR STUDIES 40 (2002)
(“adjudicative competence” is a “more appropriate term than ‘competence to stand trial,’ given that approximately
90 percent of all criminal cases in the United States are resolved by means of guilty pleas, rather than at trial”).
3
362 U.S. 402, 402 (1960) (per curiam).
4
See, e.g., Cooper v. Oklahoma, 517 U.S. 348, 357-59 & nn.8-14 (1996); Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 397, 405-06
(1993). The intertwining of insanity and competence has its origins in Blackstone and Hale, who conceived
incompetence as a form of “madness” likely distinguished from legal insanity only by reason of afflicting a
2
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competence continues to be confusingly intertwined.5 Forensic experts often undertake to
examine both competence and legal insanity at the same time and—unfortunately—by the same
criteria, generally that of insanity; courts historically have done little better.6 The two doctrines
also meet with the same generally disdainful attitude, as incompetence, like insanity, appears to
many to be a mechanism by which perpetrators of criminal acts can escape accountability.7 But
legal insanity and adjudicative competence are importantly distinct: the former looks to whether
a person is able to understand the nature and quality of her acts, so as to justify attachment of
criminal consequences, while the latter looks to whether a defendant is possessed of sufficient
capacity to defend her own interests within the various stages of an ensuing prosecution.8
Though the insanity defense claims the lion’s share of attention, adjudicative competence
is far more important. Certainly it has a much deeper reach into the defendant population.
Indeed, one commentator has asserted that “[v]irtually every criminal defendant who appears to

defendant after his offense but before trial, sentence, or execution. See 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 24 (9th
ed. 1783); M. HALE, THE HISTORY OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 34-35 (1736).
5
See Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986); see also Stewart v. Martinez-Villareal, 523 U.S. 637 (1998); ABA
CRIMINAL JUSTICE MENTAL HEALTH STANDARDS § 7-5.6(b) (1989).
6
See RONALD ROESCH & STEPHEN L. GOLDING, COMPETENCE TO STAND TRIAL 16, 51 (1980); Bruce J. Winick,
Restructuring Competency to Stand Trial, 32 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 921, 982 & nn.277-79 (1985) (“Clinicians,
particularly psychiatrists, historically have misunderstood the legal issues involved with incompetency, frequently
confusing it with legal insanity or with the clinical definition of psychosis.”).
7
See, e.g., United States v. Gigante, 166 F.3d 75 (2d Cir. 1999) (recounting multiple competency determinations in
case against Vinny “Chin” Gigante). Gigante, who was widely believed to be malingering, inspired a storyline in
The Sopranos in which Uncle Junior feigns incompetence (but later develops symptoms of incompetence). See
http://www.hbo.com/sopranos/episode/season4/episode48.shtml (last visited Oct. 22, 2005).
8
See, e.g., Godinez, 509 U.S. at 403 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (legal standards attending insanity and competence
are procedurally and substantively distinct); Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 739 & n.26 (1972) (same). Persons
are presumed to be both competent at the time of criminal proceedings and sane at the time of the offense, but may
be found both incompetent and insane (presumably in a forensic inquiry before trial, for incompetence will bar trial);
competent and insane (which must be the case whenever a defendant goes to trial but prevails on the insanity
defense); or incompetent and sane (in which case we attempt to restore competence so imposition of criminal
consequences may be determined on the merits). Conflating the two inquiries creates potential for serious injustice,
for example, by subjecting the incompetent but sane person to trial because she understands right from wrong,
despite the fact that she is not in a position adequately to protect her own interests. See Cooper, 517 U.S. at 364
(consequences of being tried while incompetent are “dire”).
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be mentally ill at any time within the criminal trial process is examined for competency,”9 as
compared with the extremely small number of defendants who mount an insanity defense.10
Actual or suspected adjudicative incompetence affects a consistently significant percentage of
misdemeanor and felony defendants:11 it is implicated in as many of 8% of cases,12 accounts for
tens of thousands of admissions to inpatient medical facilities every year,13 and easily is the most
common subject of mental health testimony in criminal cases.14 The consequences of an
incompetence adjudication are, from a defendant’s perspective, grave: such a finding may well
translate into long-term confinement, particularly for those defendants deemed dangerous to
themselves or others, without opportunity for a finding of guilt or innocence.15 Indeed, among

9

Winick, supra note 6, at 924 & n.6. Cf. ROESCH & GOLDING, supra note 6, at 192, 197 (surveyed judges granted
requests for competency evaluations whenever issue raised, regardless of perception as to necessity).
10
“The insanity defense is raised in only about 1% of felony cases in the United States, and although success rates
vary widely across jurisdictions, it is successful only in 26% of the cases where it is raised.” David R. Katner,
Raising Mental Health Issues-Other than Insanity-In Juvenile Delinquency Defense, 28 AM. J. CRIM. L. 73, n. 1
(2000) (quoting Marnie E. Rice & Grant T. Harris, The Treatment of Mentally Disordered Offenders, 3 PSYCHOL.
PUB. POL’Y & L. 126, 127 (1997)). See generally Eric Silver et al., Demythologizing Inaccurate Perceptions of the
Insanity Defense, 18 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 63 (1994); Lisa A. Callahan et al., The Volume and Characteristics of
Insanity Defense Pleas: An Eight State Study, 19 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 331 (1991).
11
A surprisingly large number of defendants accused of low-level crimes are referred for competence evaluation,
despite the relatively lenient possible punishment as compared to the potentially long
- term nature of an
incompetence commitment, whether for evaluation, treatment, or both. See Winick, supra note 6, at 941-42 &
nn.82-85; ROESCH & GOLDING, supra note 6, at 56 (30% of referred defendants in 1978 study charged with
disturbing the peace); Robert A. Burt & Norval Morris, A Proposal for Abolition of the Incompetency Plea, 40 U.
CHI. L. REV. 66, 79 & n.54 (1972) (1950s-era study indicated that within questioned-competence population
accused misdemeanants far outnumbered felons). But see ROESCH & GOLDING, supra note 6, at 52-53 (reporting
finding that those accused of violent interpersonal crimes disproportionately referred).
12
See Patricia A. Zapf & Ronald Roesch, Mental Competency Evaluations: Guidelines for Judges and Attorneys,
COURT REV. 28, 28 (Summer 2000) (2-8% of felony defendants are referred); POYTHRESS ET AL.,, supra note 2, at 9
(8%); but see Winick, supra note 6, at 928 & n.21 (1973 study of Manhattan cases showed 1% of defendants
referred).
13
See Patricia A. Zapf & Jodi L. Viljoen, Issues and Considerations Regarding the Use of Assessment Instruments
in the Evaluation of Competency to Stand Trial, 21 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 351, 352 (2003) (recent estimate of 60,000);
POYTHRESS ET AL., supra note 2, at 50 (same); Zapf & Roesch, supra note 12, at 28 (25-39,000 evaluations in
United States annually); THOMAS GRISSO, EVALUATING COMPETENCIES: FORENSIC ASSESSMENTS AND
INSTRUMENTS 79 (2d ed. 2003) (25,000).
14
“In 1994, the American Bar Association's Committee on Criminal Justice Mental Health Standards noted that ‘the
issue of present mental incompetence, quantitatively speaking, is the single most important issue in the criminal
mental health field.’" See MacArthur Research Network on Mental Health and the Law, Executive Summary,
http://macarthur.virginia.edu/adjudicate.html (last visited Oct. 22, 2005). See also Zapf & Viljoen, supra note 13, at
352 (“competency evaluations are the single most significant mental health inquiry pursued in the criminal justice
system”).
15
See, e.g., Jackson, 406 U.S. at 715.
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inpatients with criminal-justice-system involvement, those with questioned competence or who
have been adjudicated incompetent far outnumber those for whom insanity at the time of the
offense is the issue—perhaps by a margin as great as 100 to 1.16
Despite the evident importance of adjudicative competence, and despite its solid
historical pedigree,17 it remains a surprisingly neglected and ill-defined area of law.18 This is
despite the fact that the governing legal standards appear straightforward. The law is clear, for
example, that a criminal defendant has a fundamental constitutional right not to be tried,
convicted, sentenced, or executed while incompetent.19 The substantivemeaning of
“incompetence” might appear similarly clear, but in fact is theoretically slippery.20 The meaning
of each term embedded within the Dusky standard—notably the distinction between a “rational”
and a “factual” understanding—has escaped significant elaboration by courts and theorists.21 It

16

See Winick, supra note 6, at 19 n.3; see also Burt & Morris, supra note 11, at 66 n.1 (1967 study found over half
of criminal offenders in surveyed hospitals admitted for incompetence while insanity acquittees accounted for 4%)
(citing P. SCHEIDEMANDEL & C. KANNO, THE MENTALLY ILL OFFENDER 20 (1969)).
17
See, e.g., Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437, 446 (1992) (“The rule that a criminal defendant who is incompetent
should not be required to stand trial has deep roots in our common-law heritage.”); Cooper, 517 U.S. at 357 (citing
King v. Frith, 22 How. St. Tr. 307, 311 (1790) and King v. Pritchard, 7 Car. & P. 303, 173 Eng. Rep. 135 (1836));
Youtsey v. United States, 97 F. 937 (6th Cir. 1899); United States v. Lawrence, 26 F. Cas. 887 (D.C. Cir. 1835);
Guagando v. State, 41 Tex. 626 (1874); Freeman v. People, 4 Denio 9, 24 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1847).
18
See Richard J. Bonnie, The Competence of Criminal Defendants: Beyond Dusky and Drope, 47 U. MIAMI L. REV.
539, 540-41 (1993). This neglect is most pronounced in the academic legal literature; the forensic literature is
significantly more developed. See, e.g., RICHARD I. FREDERICK ET AL., EXAMINATIONS OF COMPETENCY TO STAND
TRIAL: FOUNDATIONS IN MENTAL HEALTH LAW (2004); GRISSO, supra note 13; POYTHRESS ET AL., supra note 2;
Zapf & Roesch, supra note 12; PSYCHOLOGICAL EVALUATIONS FOR THE COURTS: A HANDBOOK FOR MENTAL
HEALTH PROFESSIONALS AND LAWYERS 119-85 (Gary Melton et al. eds., 2nd ed. 1997).
19
See Godinez, 509 U.S. at 389; Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162 (1975); Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375 (1966).
While the Court has left open a small window for experimentation with “innocence-only” adjudications of the
incompetent, see Jackson, 406 U.S. at 740-41 & n.29-31, that invitation has not been answered. Further, a different
substantive standard of “competence” applies in the execution context. See Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399,399
(1986); see also note 53, infra.
20
See Burt & Morris, supra note 11, at 92 (“The present substantive standard for competency is elusive.”); Zapf &
Roesch, supra note 12, at 28 (“although the concept of competency to stand trial has been long established in law, its
definition, as exemplified by the ambiguities of Dusky, has never been explicit”).
21
See Zapf & Roesch, supra note 12, at 28 (crucial terms within Dusky standard ill-defined); Zapf & Viljoen, supra
note 13, at 352; United States v. Housh, 89 F. Supp.2d 1227, 1229 (D. Kan. 2000) (few cases “have given meaning
to the ‘rational understanding’ phraseology used by the Dusky court”).
The “rational understanding” test appears in both the “communication with counsel” and “understanding of
the proceedings” prongs of the Dusky standard. There would appear to be no meaningful distinction between the
terms as used in these two prongs; further, courts seldom address them
separately. One sense in which the first
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is also highly unpredictable in application, in large part because the task of implementing Dusky
generally falls to forensic experts, to whom courts defer heavily but to whom firm guidance as to
the legal standard is seldom given.22 These experts—typically psychologists and psychiatrists,
but sometimes specialists in other areas of medicine and the mind sciences23—may differ wildly
in approach, theoretical framework, understanding of the relevant legal constructs, and
conclusions. Factually similar cases therefore may meet different outcomes; indeed, it is
common for different experts to reach diametrically opposed conclusions in the same case.24
Forensic experts and legal theorists have collaborated, particularly in very recent years, to
formulate standardized mechanisms for defining and measuring competence-relevant facts, but
these tests are not yet widely used, despite their promise of promoting some measure of
uniformity.25

requirement might be independently significant is where a rational defendant lacks mechanical ability to
communicate. Cf. Jackson, 406 U.S. at 715 . The type of irrationality about which Dusky is primarily concerned,
though, is a rational decision-making deficit, which might affect both understanding of the proceedings and ability
to communicate with counsel. See Part I.B., infra.
22
See, e.g., Zapf & Viljoen, supra note 13,at 364 (showing agreement rates of almost 100%, though “the typical
forensic evaluation is left largely unguided”); Grant H. Morris et al., Competency to Stand Trial on Trial, 4 HOUS. J.
HEALTH L. & POL’Y 193, 193,199 -200 & nn.28-30 (2004) (35% of surveyed judges never disagreed with an
expert’s assessment of competency; 65% rarely or occasionally disagreed); ROESCH & GOLDING, supra note 6, at 17
(“judges rarely base their decisions on anything but the concluding statement in the psychiatric report to the court.”);
Medina, 505 U.S. at 465 (“Competency determinations by and large turn on the testimony of psychiatric experts, not
lawyers.”) (citing study showing rates of court agreement with experts’ recommendations “typically exceeding
90%”).
23
See Winick, supra note 6 at 930 & nn.29-30 (historical reliance on psychiatrists giving way to increasing reliance
on psychologists, social workers, and examiners from other disciplines); see also LEDOUX, supra note 1, at 39
(defining “mind sciences”).
24
See, e.g., Morris et al., supra note 22, at 215-16; Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127 (1992) (four experts expressed
range of opinions and conclusions).
25
See generally POYTHRESS ET AL., supra note 2. See also GRISSO, supra note 13, at 80-81 (low rates of reported
use of forensic assessment instruments); Zapf & Viljoen, supra note 13, at 363-64 (same).
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In short, adjudicative competence, despite its enormous importance, is on whole a
surprisingly ramshackle affair.26 It is poorly understood, undertheorized, and inconsistently
implemented.
This Article proposes that a coherent theory and practice of adjudicative competence
requires a robustly articulated concept of the baseline rationality we expect of criminal
defendants. The first step in such an articulation is recognition that the Dusky standard embraces
a requirement of “decisional competence,” that is, the ability to make, communicate, and
implement minimally rational and self-protective choices within the unique context of the
criminal case.27 Further, both cognition and emotion—colloquially, thinking and feeling—make
important contributions to such rational decision-making capacity.
Part I.A situates adjudicative competence within a family of law-relevant competencies
and briefly outlines the decision points at which it may affect any given criminal proceeding.
Part I.B demonstrates that decisional competence is inherent in the “rational understanding”
component of the Dusky standard. Part I.C then articulatesthe necessary components of the
rational decision-making on which a criminal defendant’s decisional competence depends.
Drawing on certain courts’ analysis of the disruptive effects of psychotic thought disorder, this
Section models how an appropriately fine-grained analysis of competence will seek to articulate
precisely where in the decision-making process the defendant has gone astray and explain why
those defects implicate ability to represent her own interests within a criminal proceeding.
Part II then argues that the role of emotion is wrongly neglected in the traditional account
of decision-making, including its application to adjudicative competence, and that attention to

26

See Winick, supra note 6, at 922 (adjudicative competency is the “status in the criminal mental health system that
is perhaps most frequently misunderstood by attorneys, judges, and mental health professionals, as well as by the
public”).
27
The term was coined by Bonnie. Bonnie, supra note 18, at 567. See also Part I.B., infra.
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emotion’s role illuminates certain threats to competence that are not perceptible with a solely
cognitive view. The historical privileging of cognition within adjudicative competence mirrors
the traditional, if of late largely discredited, disparagement and neglect of emotion within both
law and the mind sciences. Part II.A therefore calls special attention to emotion’s role in
decision-making. Part II.B then explores two illustrative contexts in which a focus on emotion
will yield results that a cognitive inquiry likely will not: cases in which a defendant suffers from
a severe psychiatric mood disorder or from organic brain damage, where one (or both) conditions
unreasonably interferes with decision-relevant emotional perception, processing, and expression.
Existing legal theory and forensic testing methods do not explicitly account for competencerelevant emotional dysfunction, and a predominantly cognitive approach is likely to miss or
discount its impact.
Part III addresses weighty issues of implementation and policy, asking how a focus on
the thinking-and-feeling elements of rational decision-making might be applied and whether
such an application would further the goals of the adjudicative competence doctrine without
unduly threatening other valuable societal goals. This Part argues that the transparency benefits
of this approach are substantial and, further, thatit could be implemented with an acceptable
level of reliability and consistency. Part III proposes further that while this approach may
generate tensions with other social goods—such as promoting defendant autonomy and
protecting public safety—it will not add appreciably to those tensions already attending the
adjudicative competence inquiry.
This Article concludes that a proper view of the Dusky standard requires that, when
judging whether a defendant is competent to decide for herself how to navigate the shoals of
criminal prosecution, we look to both her thought processes and emotional functioning.
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I.

Rational Understanding and Rational Decision-Making

Adjudicative competence doctrine, like all law-relevant competencies, traditionally has
sought to balance competing interests. On the side of finding competence wherever possible are
respect for a defendant’s autonomy and the state’s interest in enforcing its criminal law; the
countervailing interest is, fundamentally, that of protecting those who cannot protect
themselves.28 Significantly, the common-law doctrine of competence is thought to have
developed “‘as a by-product of the ban against trials in absentia; the mentally incompetent
defendant, though physically present in the courtroom, is in reality afforded no opportunity to
defend himself.’”29 Prosecution of an incompetent defendant is thought to be an unfair fight of
the worst kind, one that threatens grave harm to the individual, threatens reliability of outcome,
and erodes the dignity of the process. Adjudicative competence thus is “fundamental to an
adversary system of justice.”30 For the adversary system to have legitimacy, the defendant must
be meaningfully present as an autonomous actor capable of taking, should she so choose,
permissible steps to attempt to protect herself from the assertion of state power.
Adjudicative competence therefore may be implicated at any stage in a criminal proceeding
at which it appears that the defendant may lack such self-protective capacity, and—as the
following Sections demonstrate—at each such juncture the operative inquiry is whether she is
capable of making rational decisions in service of her defense. While this focus on “decisional
competence” has not been explicitly endorsed by the Supreme Court, it is implicit in the caselaw;
indeed, it is hard to imagine a viable concept of competence that excludes it. Accepting a role
28

See, e.g., Medina, 505 U.S. at 457 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); Bonnie, supra note 18, at 551-53; Morris et al.,
supra note 22, at 201 & n.38; Winick, supra note 6, at 949-52 & n.134.
29
Drope, 420 U.S. at 171 (quoting Caleb Foote, A Comment on Pre-Trial Commitment of Criminal Defendants, 108
U. PA. L. REV. 832, 834 (1960)).
30
Drope, 420 U.S. at 171; see also Cooper, 517 U.S. at 364. The adversarial nature of the adjudicative competence
construct is perhaps what most distinguishes it from other law-relevant competencies, particularly capacity to
consent to medical treatment.
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for decisional competence requires a theory as to the necessary components of rational decisionmaking with reference to the particular decisions facing criminal defendants.31 This Part
undertakes an articulation of those components and, using examples from certain cases involving
psychotic defendants, demonstrates how such an approach promotes accuracy and transparency
in competence determinations.
A. Introduction to Adjudicative Competence
Adjudicative competence is but one in a family of legal competency constructs that
includes capacity to consent to or refuse medical care and research, enter into a contract, execute
a will, and handle one’s own property and finances.32 Some legal (in)competencies are statusbased—for example, the law categorically deems children unable to make any number of
decisions on their own behalf—but the majority are individually-determined departures from a
baseline assumption of autonomy.33
Three common threads tie all law-relevant competencies together. First, competence is
best understood as (to borrow a term familiar to the sciences but relatively foreign to law) an
open-textured construct, the meaning of which “can never be fully reducible to a set of concrete
observations and observational terms.”34 Because competence “is an abstraction” that “retains
the elusive quality of an idea,” law provides “broad discretion in determining whether a set of

31

See Bonnie, supra note 18, at 548 (“The greatest need for theoretical development arises in relation to decisional
competence.”); see also id. at 571 (“case law on decisional competence in criminal adjudication” is “skimpy”).
32
See GRISSO, supra note 13, at 7. Competence to consent to and refuse medical treatment is perhaps the most
explored of these. See generally THOMAS GRISSO & PAUL S. APPELBAUM, ASSESSING COMPETENCE TO CONSENT
TO TREATMENT (1998).
33
See, e.g., Paul S. Appelbaum, Ought we to Require Emotional Capacity as Part of Decisional Competence? 8
KENNEDY INST. OF ETHICS J. 377, 378 (1999) (“Contemporary ideas of competence are tied inextricably to the ideal
of self-determination in modern Western societies.”).
34
ROESCH & GOLDING, supra note 6, at 12-13 (“no absolute set of facts is ever dispositive of competency,” though
the “’rationally consult, assist, and comprehend’ standard of Dusky (and the surrounding cases) is an attempt, albeit
rather vague, to set forth the theoretical terms of the competency construct”) (emphases in original); see also
GRISSO, supra note 13, at 22-23; Bonnie, supra note 18, at 549 & n.43.
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case facts satisfies the criteria.”35 Second, connecting all legal competencies is the recognition
that “some individuals may not have the capacities to make important decisions in their lives”
and that these “incapacities may jeopardize their welfare or that of others.” 36 Law therefore
provides a mechanism for identifying such individuals and in such cases authorizes (and
sometimes obligates) the state to curtail their rights.37 Courts make these decisions with
deliberately heavy reliance on mental health professionals.38 Third, because determinations of
legal incompetence are by nature profoundly paternalistic,39 the objective is not to ensure that an
individual has the highest possible level of decision-makingcapacity , but rather to avoid state
intervention if she has the bare minimum required.40
Moreover, the relevant decision-making capacity is utterly context-dependent; no single
legal criterion or test applies across all legal competencies, and the law does not presume that
(in)competence in one arena will imply or affect (in)competence in another.41 The consequence
of incompetence also will vary: in some situations, such as inability to handle one’s financial
affairs, surrogate decision-making may be permitted; in others, the subject will be unable to
access a good, such as dangerous medical treatment to which she is incompetent to consent; and
in others, such as inability to provide for the basics of one’s survival, the person may be
institutionalized.

35

GRISSO, supra note 13, at 22-23.
Id. at 2.
37
See id.
38
See id.
39
See, e.g., Elyn R. Saks & Stephen H. Behnke, Competency to Decide on Treatment and Research: MacArthur and
Beyond, 10 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 103, 104 (1999) (“the tension between autonomy and paternalism remains
central to the assessment of competency”).
40
See Burt & Morris, supra note 11, at 85; see also Appelbaum, supra note 33, at 378.
41
See GRISSO, supra note 13, at 9; Zapf & Viljoen, supra note 13, at 361 (empirical studies show that “assessed
competencies in one area of functioning are rarely homogenous with competencies in other areas of functioning”);
Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166, 183 (2003) (defendant may be incompetent to be tried but competent to refuse
medical treatment).
36
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As part of the universe of legal competencies, adjudicative competence, broadly defined,
includes competence to waive Miranda rights; plead guilty; dismiss counsel; stand trial and
make the various decisions required during trial; pursue or abandon appeals and other avenues
for post-conviction relief; and be executed.42
Within any given criminal case, then, the issue of competence may be raised at multiple
junctures.43 After a defendant is arrested and charged, any party (or the trial judge) may raise the
issue of possible incompetence. The court will then determine whether there is a bona fide doubt
as to competence.44 If not, the case proceeds (though the process may well begin again if
incompetence is argued at a later point). If so, the court will order an inquiry in conformance
with the law of the jurisdiction, which will almost certainly entail examination by a mental health
professional (and likely more than one) in an inpatient or outpatient setting. A clinical expert (or
experts) will likely submit a written report and testify at a hearing, and probably will proffer a
recommendation as to the ultimate issue of legal competence.45 The trial court is
overwhelmingly likely to agree with the expert recommendation.46 If multiple experts give

42
GRISSO, supra note 13, at 3. Because Miranda competence and the competence of juveniles both are the subject
of an extensive and generally separate jurisprudence, neither is addressed in this Article. However, some of the
arguments herein may well apply with equal force to juveniles. See, e.g., MENTAL HEALTH SCREENING AND
ASSESSMENT IN JUVENILE JUSTICE (Thomas Grisso et al. eds., 2005); Thomas Grisso et al., Juveniles’ Competence
to Stand Trial: A Comparison of Adolescents’ and Adults’ Capacities as Trial Defendants, 27 LAW & HUM. BEHAV.
333 (2003).
43
For a graphical rendering of this process, see ROESCH & GOLDING, supra note 6, at 131-38 & Figure 5-1.
44
See Drope, 420 U.S. at 162; Pate, 383 U.S. at 375 .
45
See ROESCH & GOLDING, supra note 6, at 18 (experts “typically testify in conclusory terms, often parroting the
statutory language”); Bonnie, supra note 18, at 550 (“judges practically insist on ultimate issue opinion in reports
and testimony on competence to stand trial”). There is a substantial debate as to whether a competence examiner
ever should proffer an opinion as to the ultimate issue of adjudicative incompetence. See Zapf & Viljoen, supra
note 13, at 364 n.7; GRISSO, supra note 13, at 81-82; Christopher Slobogin, The ‘ultimate issue’ issue, 7 BEHAV.
SCI. & L. 259 (1989).
46
See note 21, supra (agreement rates near 100%).
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differing testimony, the court is likely to side with the prosecution’s expert, as the burden of
proof as to incompetence generally will rest with the defendant.47
If the defendant is found competent, trial will continue (again, with the same caveat as to
new evidence of incompetence, which may take the form of increasingly erratic behavior at
trial). If, however, the defendant is found incompetent, she will be subjected to a period of
continued evaluation and treatment—potentially including involuntary medication should certain
stringent requirements be met48—in accordance with jurisdiction-specific timelines, bounded by
an outside requirement of “reasonableness.”49 Should competence at any point be restored,
proceedings will resume; but should the defendant be deemed unlikely to be restored to
competence within a “reasonable” time, she must be released or civil commitment proceedings
commenced.50 During a period of indeterminate incompetence it is not clear whether the
criminal charges may remain pending, or for how long.51
Finally, should a competent defendant be sentenced to death, she may face further inquiry
should she decide to waive all appeals,52 and may have a claim of incompetence to be executed if
she has experienced a substantial decline in mental health while incarcerated.53
47

See Medina, 505 U.S. at 451-52 (state may place burden on defendant to show incompetence by a preponderance
of the evidence); Cooper, 517 U.S. at 348 (state may not impose clear and convincing evidence burden on
defendant).
48
See Sell, 539 U.S. at 179; Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127 (1992); Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210 (1990).
49
See Jackson, 406 U.S. at 738 (unconstitutional to confine defendant indefinitely solely on basis of adjudicative
incompetence; confinement may continue only for a reasonable period to determine likelihood of competence
restoration or be justified by progress toward that goal).
50
See id. Many or most adjudicatively incompetent defendants likely can be shown to be dangerous to themselves
or others, subjecting them in most jurisdictions to civil commitment. Some commentators have complained that
Jackson has not prevented permanent commitment for the adjudicatively incompetent but merely has shifted the
mechanism. See Winick, supra note 6, at 927 & n.17, 940-41 & nn.73-79; ROESCH & GOLDING, supra note 6, at
150, 357; Burt & Morris, supra note 11.
51
This question was left unanswered by Jackson. See 406 U.S. at 740 (declining to reach question of whether due
process prohibits “holding pending criminal charges indefinitely over the head of one who will never have a chance
to prove his innocence”).
52
See Rees v. Peyton, 384 U.S. 312 (1966) (per curiam).
53
See Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986). The standard for competence to be executed is a relatively minimal
one, looking to whether the prisoner has “mental capacity to understand the nature of the death penalty and the
reasons why it was imposed on him,” id. at 403-04 (quoting FL. STAT. § 922.07 (1985)), which generally is
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Unfortunately, the substantive meaning of the competency construct underlying this
relatively straightforward procedure remains largely undeveloped. But one strong theme that
emerges from the cases, albeit largely sub rosa, is that—consistent with competence inquiries
generally—the primary concern should be whether the defendant is capable of making critical
decisions. As the following Section demonstrates, such “decisional competence” is an integral
component of the Dusky standard.
B. Decisional Competence as a Component of Adjudicative
Competence
The roots of the decisional competence construct may be found in Dusky itself.54 In
Dusky the Court was faced with a defendant who, according to medical experts, suffered from
schizophrenia but “understood what he was charged with, knew that if there was a trial it would
be before a judge and jury, knew that if found guilty he could be punished, … knew who his
attorney was and that it was his duty to protect the defendant’s rights,” and could furnish at least
some relevant historical information with substantial accuracy.55 His incompetence, they
testified, stemmed not from inability to grasp factual concepts but, rather, from the “confused
thinking” caused by his mental illness, which they asserted had rendered him unable to “interpret
reality from unreality.”56 Nonetheless, the district court found Dusky competent to proceed to
trial.57

interpreted to require only a showing that those to be executed “know the fact of their impending execution and the
reason for it,” id. at 422 (Powell, J., concurring). If this is the correct standard, competence to be executed likely
requires little or none of the decision-making capacity discussed with regard to adjudicative competence in Part I.B.,
infra. However, such capacity might be relevant were a more expansive notion of competence to be executed
adopted. See, e.g., id. at 408, 414-15 (appearing to regard as relevant whether condemned inmate can confer with
counsel and contribute to an assessment of the fairness and accuracy of the sentence); SANFORD H. KADISH &
STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER, CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS PROCESSES: CASES AND MATERIALS 877-78 (7th ed. 2001); ABA
CRIMINAL JUSTICE MENTAL HEALTH STANDARDS 7-5.6(b) (1989).
54
362 U.S. 402 (1960) (per curiam).
55
Dusky v. United States, 271 F.2d 385, 388, 389-92 (8th Cir. 1959).
56
Id.
57
See id. at 389-90.
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In a brief per curiam opinion, the Court accepted verbatim the Solicitor General’s
proposed definition of competence:
[I]t is not enough for the district judge to find that “the defendant [is] oriented to
time and place and [has] some recollection of events” … the “test must be
whether he has sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a
reasonable degree of rational understanding—and whether he has a rational as
well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him.”58
Thus, the “factual understanding” displayed by Dusky was necessary but not sufficient for
competence. What was also required was some sort of “rational understanding,” which, though
apparently crucial, remained undefined.
Subsequent cases attempting to define what evidence would raise a bona fide doubt as to
Dusky incompetence have yielded some additional hints as to what types of “irrationality” might
be relevant. The Court, while resisting any attempt to define “a general standard” for such
evidence,59 has delineated certain facts that generally warrant further inquiry—such as a “history
of pronounced irrational behavior”60 or a recent suicide attempt61—and others that are
insufficient to foreclose the inquiry even if relevant to the ultimate determination—such as lucid
speech and behavior in the courtroom62 or a lack of “delusional thinking.”63 Despite these clues,
the value added by a requirement of “rational” as well as “factual” understanding has remained
unclear.

58

362 U.S. at 402 (quoting from Solicitor General’s brief). The experts defined “oriented to time, place, and
person” thus: “This means that he is able to know the day of the week, the hour, the place in which he finds himself
geographically, and the circumstances of his present situation. He knows he is in a court room; he knows the day of
the week and the day of the year, and he knows that you are his attorney and Judge Smith is the judge.” Dusky, 271
F.2d at 389.
Though Dusky pertained only to the proper interpretation of the federal competence statute, 18 U.S.C. §
4244 (2005), some version of the Dusky test now has been adopted in virtually every jurisdiction. See Winick,
supra note 6, at 923 n.4; see also MODEL PENAL CODE §4.04 (1962).
59
Drope, 420 U.S. at 172.
60
Pate, 383 U.S. at 385.
61
See Drope, 420 U.S. at 177, 179.
62
See Pate, 383 U.S. at 385-86.
63
Drope, 420 U.S. at 177-78.
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That situation changed somewhat with Godinez v. Moran,64 in which the Court read a
decision-making focus into the standard for Dusky rationality. Godinez answered a brewing
debate among the lower courts and commentators as to whether different substantive standards
of competency applied to different aspects, or at different stages, of a criminal proceeding.65 The
short answer, the Court held, was no.
Richard Allen Moran, charged with killing the owner and a patron of a bar as well as his
former wife, was found competent not only to stand trial but also to waive his rights to an
attorney and trial; after a colloquy, the trial court accepted his waiver of counsel and plea; and he
was convicted and sentenced to death.66 Moran later argued that he had been “mentally
incompetent to represent himself.”67 The Ninth Circuit agreed, reasoning that while Moran
might have been Dusky-competent for purposes of standing trial with counsel, he should have
been found competent to waive counsel and plead guilty only if determined also to have “the
capacity for ‘reasoned choice’ among the alternatives available to him.”68 The Ninth Circuit
interpreted such capacity for “reasoned choice” as articulating a different (and more stringent)
standard than that outlined in Dusky.69

64

509 U.S. 389 (1993).
The chief proponent of a “Dusky-plus” standard for certain critical decisions was Bonnie. See Bonnie, supra note
18.
66
See Godinez, 509 U.S. at 392-93.
67
Id. at 393.
68
Id. at 394. This “reasoned choice” standard was drawn from Rees v. Peyton, in which the Court held that a deathrow inmate was competent to waive appeals only if he were shown to have “capacity to appreciate his position and
make a rational choice with respect to continuing or abandoning further litigation or on the other hand whether he is
suffering from a mental disease, disorder, or defect which may substantially affect his capacity in the premises.”
384 U.S. 312, 314 (1966) (per curiam); see also Godinez, 509 U.S. at 415 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (“The standard
applied by the Ninth Circuit in this case—the “reasoned choice” standard—closely approximates the “rational
choice” standard set forth in Rees.”).
69
Similarly, Bonnie had argued that decision-making capacity was not required in every case. Rather, he explicitly
“unhinge[ed] decisional competence from the Dusky formula,” with the former coming into play only after Dusky
competence is established and certain decisions faced by the defendant. Bonnie, supra note 18, at 577-87.
65
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The Court rejected the notion that there was a substantive difference between “reasoned
choice” and “rational understanding.”70 Listing the wide array of choices required of defendants
whether they go to trial or plead guilty, the Court held that the same standard applied to both
universes of decision-making.71 The only sense in which a higher standard applied is that certain
decisions—such as those made by Moran to discharge counsel and plead guilty—additionally
require a separate determination that they were made knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily.72
In the end, the Court appeared to regard the dispute as one of semantics, as it believed capacity
for “reasoned choice” or “rational choice” to mean nothing other than a “rational understanding”
in the Dusky sense.73
Decided more than three decades after Dusky, Godinez represents the Court’s most
specific effort to explain what “rational understanding” might mean.74 The effort is in one sense
frustratingly opaque: after Godinez, “rational understanding” likely means what the Ninth Circuit
meant when it spoke of capacity for “reasoned choice,” though it might mean something slightly
different and somehow less demanding.75 What is clear, though, is the Court’s focus on

70

Godinez, 509 U.S. at 397-98 (how the standards might differ “is not readily apparent,” and even respondent
argued that the distinction was “merely one of ‘terminology’”); see also id. at 398 n.9; id. at 407 (pointing to “the
lack of any clear distinction between a ‘rational understanding’ and a ‘reasoned choice’ in this case”) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring).
71
See id. at 398-400.
72
See id. at 400-02 (citing, inter alia, Westbrook v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 150 (1966) (per curiam), and Johnson v.
Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938)); see also Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975). As the Court clarified:
The focus of a competency inquiry is the defendant’s mental capacity; the question is whether he
has the ability to understand the proceedings. … The purpose of the “knowing and voluntary”
inquiry, by contrast, is to determine whether the defendant actually does understand the
significance and consequences of a particular decision and whether the decision is uncoerced.
509 U.S. at 401 n.12. “In this sense,” then, “there is a ‘heightened’ standard for pleading guilty and for waiving the
right to counsel, but it is not a heightened standard of competence.” Id. at 401.
73
See id. at 397-98.
74
See Bonnie, supra note 18, at 593 (before Godinez, the Court had “not had the occasion to elaborate further on the
substantive aspects of the competence doctrine”).
75
509 U.S. at 397-98 (holding that, were there a difference between reasoned choice and rational understanding, the
latter describes the required level of competence).
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defendant decision-making as the crucial capacity to which the rationality aspect of the
competence construct is directed.
To be sure, Godinez did not use the term “decisional competence,” urged on it by prominent
commentators,76 or make absolutely explicit that the Dusky standard was meant to embrace such
a concept. Indeed, the dissenters complained bitterly that the majority had imposed an unduly
passive notion of Dusky competence on very consequential decisions.77 Some therefore have
interpreted Godinez “to mean that defendants’ decision making abilities need not be considered
when making judgments about their competence, because the Dusky standard makes no specific
reference to ‘decision making.’”78 But this conclusion is belied by the Godinez majority’s nearly
single-minded focus on the various decisions that might be required of a criminal defendant.79
Indeed, the Court asserted that
all criminal defendants—not merely those who plead guilty—may be required to
make important decisions once criminal proceedings have been initiated. And
while the decision to plead guilty is undeniably a profound one, it is no more
complicated than the sum total of decisions that a defendant may be called upon to
make during the course of a trial.80
That the Dusky standard must be understood to revolve around ability to make rational decisions
pertaining to one’s status as a criminal defendant was reinforced by Justice Kennedy, who in
concurrence stated flatly that “[w]hat is at issue here is whether the defendant has sufficient
competence to take part in a criminal proceeding and to make the decisions throughout its
course.”81

76

See, e.g., Bonnie, supra note 18.
See Godinez, 509 U.S. at 412-13, 415-16 & n.3.
78
GRISSO, supra note 13, at 73.
79
Godinez, 509 U.S. at 399 (“there is no reason to believe that the decision to waive counsel requires an appreciably
higher level of mental functioning than the decision to waive other constitutional rights”).
80
Id. at 398-99 (therefore, if the “Dusky standard is adequate for defendants who plead not guilty, it is necessarily
adequate for those who plead guilty”).
81
Id. at 403 (Kennedy, J., concurring); see also id. at 406-07 (single standard applicable to “the variety of decisions
that a defendant must make”); 408 (imposing different competence standards “for each decision” would be
77
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Accordingly, in very recent years a number of forensic theorists have embraced the
notion that decisional competence not only survived Godinez but was in fact promoted to a
protected position within the Dusky standard.82 Significantly, a panel of theorists and
practitioners who collaborated on a comprehensive, long-term MacArthur foundation
adjudicative competence study defined decisional competence as a discrete domain and designed
a forensic assessment instrument specifically to measure such competence.83 The MacArthur
study also revealed that discrete measurement of decisional competence might “catch” some who
otherwise would be deemed competent.84 And far from being controversial, the centrality of
decisional competence is widely accepted in the field of competence to consent to medical
treatment.85

unworkable). Moreover, the primacy of decision-making abilities was reaffirmed in Cooper, in which a unanimous
Court cited Godinez for the proposition that the fundamental unfairness of trying an incompetent defendant stems
from his inability to make the myriad of decisions, both large and small, concerning the course of his defense. See
Cooper, 517 U.S. at 364.
82
GRISSO, supra note 13, at 73; see also id. at 93 (defining decisional competence as the abilities needed for
“autonomous decision making with respect to strategic issues that arise in the course of prosecution”); Steven K.
Hoge et al., The MacArthur Adjudicative Competence Study: Development & Validation of a Research Instrument,
21 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 144, 330 (1997) (the heart of competence is ability “to make rational, self-interested
decisions”).
83
See POYTHRESS ET AL., supra note 2, at 38. The MacArthur Competence Assessment Tool-Criminal
Adjudication (“MacCAT-CA”) is the first competence assessment instrument to seek to measure decision-making
capacity directly. See GRISSO, supra note 13, at 146 (“The MacCAT-CA and the FIT-R come closer than earlier
instruments to providing information that goes beyond ‘factual understanding’ to begin to address questions of
defendants’ decision making capacities. This is an important advance, and instruments that do not provide such
information are out of step with the evolution of the legal competence construct of competence in recent years.”).
The MacArthur team, of which Bonnie was part, agreed with Bonnie’s pre-Godinez theory that decisional
competence becomes of independent significance only in cases in which the defendant is competent to assist
counsel, and that decisional deficits might be overcome with surrogate decision-making. These particular aspects of
their decisional competence formulation are not necessarily supported by Godinez.
84
One quarter of incompetent defendants studied were impaired on at least one decisional competence measure
despite scoring as unimpaired on measures of competence to assist counsel. See POYTHRESS ET AL., supra note 2, at
103-04. The sample from which this data was obtained was persons who had been deemed incompetent, implying
that perhaps no discrete measurement is necessary because decisionally-incompetent persons are already being
captured adequately. This is not necessarily so. The data simply show that among those adjudicated incompetent
there are persons with serious decisional deficits, and we do not know how such persons’ incompetence was
captured. It remains possible that where courts and examiners are focusing solely on non-decisional capacities such
persons may be wrongly deemed competent.
85
See, e.g., Louis C. Charland, Appreciation and Emotion: Theoretical Reflections on the MacArthur Treatment
Competence Study, 8 KENNEDY INST. OF ETHICS J. 359, 360 (1999) (defining competence to consent to treatment as
“decision-making capacity”).
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The extent to which a focus on decisional capacity is being implemented in the criminallaw context, however, unquestionably is hindered by the lack of transparency in the caselaw, in
which “rational understanding,” not rational decision-making, remains the operative term.
Expert assessments, which form the sole basis for nearly all judicial determinations of
adjudicative competence, “tend to give little, if any, attention to decisional competence.”86 Even
those most prominently advocating a decisional competence approach concede that its precise
meaning “within the well-established Dusky formula is not clear at present.”87 This confusion
should be put to rest. Decisional competence should be recognized as the core of adjudicative
competence.
C. A Theoretical Model of Competence-Relevant Decision-Making
Having shown that rational decision-making capacity is key to Dusky rational understanding,
it is essential to define more precisely the decisions at issue. Some decisions facing criminal
defendants—for example, strategic calls as to whether to waive indictment or demand certain
forms of discovery—routinely are entrusted to the attorney, while others plainly are the province
of the defendant.88 These defendant-driven decisions are whether to demand a jury trial,
represent oneself, testify on one’s own behalf, be present at trial, or plead guilty.89 More
broadly, the defendant is thought also to have the right to make global decisions as to the theory
86
POYTHRESS ET AL., supra note 2, at 11. A 1998 study concluded that examiners “primarily paid attention to
understanding and appreciation abilities and neglected the defendant’s capacity to make[] decisions in a large
majority” of reports. Zapf & Viljoen, supra note 13, at 364 (citing to Jennifer Skeem et al., Logic and reliability of
evaluations of competence to stand trial, 22 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 519 (1998)). This trend might shift should the
MacCAT-CA come to be more widely used.
87
See Bonnie, supra note 18, at 593-94 (courts “are confused” as to “whether and how the components of the Dusky
formula, as later embellished in Drope, apply to impairments of abilities required for rational decision-making”);
POYTHRESS ET AL., supra note 2, at (“Future elaborations on the functional capacities required for adjudicative
competence may be informed by research that reveals important distinctions between merely assisting counsel (in a
comparatively passive sense) and the capacity to actively engage in decision making relevant to constructing a
criminal defense or to weighing options that are presented in the course of the adjudicatory process.”).
88
Bonnie, supra note 18, at 546, 559, 568.
89
See id. at 553 & nn.57-58, 568-69 & nn.102-105, 109. See also Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 418 n.24 (1988)
(dictum); Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242 (1969); Adams v. United States ex rel. Mc Cann, 317 U.S. 269,
278-81 (1942); United States v. Teague, 953 F.2d 1525 (11th Cir. 1992) (en banc).
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of her defense—for example, whether to pursue an insanity defense—and the objectives to be
pursued by counsel.90 When we speak of decisional competence, then, it is the competence to
make these choices, and not a more general decision-making ability, about which the law should
care. And construing the requirement of rational decision-making capacity in light of the goals
sought to be balanced by adjudicative competence doctrine,91 we may conclude further that the
decisional capacity we demand of a criminal defendant is that which renders her capable of
making critical defendant-driven decisions in a minimally rational and self-protective manner.
Still, the content of such “rationality” requires yet further explication. Rationality is far
from self-defining.92 Though it is difficult to articulate the components of decision-making
processes, and more difficult still to judge the rationality of their operation, recent decades have
seen significant advances in our understanding of such processes.93 Exploring the relevance of
such research for adjudicative competence, and demonstrating how a decision-making focus
sometimes is invoked in the cases, illuminates an approach that may give substance to the
sketchy outlines of Dusky rational understanding.
The literature on decision-making is vast,94 but there is some degree of consensus as to
the necessary building blocks of the types of decisions faced by criminal defendants. As an

90

See Bonnie, supra note 18, at 553 n.58; see also ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE § 4-5.2 (1986).
See pp. 8-9, infra. See also Steven J. Morse, Rationality and Responsibility, 74 SO. CAL. L. REV. 251, 254
(2005); see also Steven J. Morse, Diminished Rationality, Diminished Responsibility, 1 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 289,
295 (2003) (“How much rational capacity must be impaired under what conditions to warrant excuse or mitigation
is, of course, a normative, moral, political, and legal question.”). While Morse’s discussions of rationality are
positioned within a discussion of responsibility, they nonetheless may inform understanding of the concept within
the competence construct.
92
Steven J. Morse, Brain and Blame, 84 GEO. L. REV. 527, 530 (1996) (“There is no uncontroversial definition of
rationality.”).
93
See, e.g., Keith J. Holyoak & Robert G. Morrison, Thinking and Reasoning: A Reader’s Guide, in THE
CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF THINKING AND REASONING 1, 3 (Keith J. Holyoak & Robert G. Morrison eds., 2005)
(“Thinking and reasoning, long the academic province of philosophy, have over the past century emerged as core
topics of empirical investigation and theoretical analysis in the modern fields known as cognitive psychology,
cognitive science, and cognitive neuroscience.”).
94
An overview of this complex topic goes far beyond the project of this Article. For an introduction to the field, see
generally THE ROUTINES OF DECISION MAKING (Tilmann Betsch & Susanne Haberstroh eds., 2005); EMERGING
91
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initial matter, most agree that a focus on rationality should look to process rather than outcome,
despite the fact that the latter is far more accessible.95 The danger of adopting a predominantly
outcome-driven test for competence-relevant rationality is that it may encourage examiners and
courts simply to substitute their judgments for those of defendants whose choices appear
misguided.96 Judging reasonableness of outcome can play an important role, as manifestly
bizarre or self-destructive decisions might be evidence of a faulty process, but it is to that process
that the search for rationality should be directed.97
Decision-making processes generally may be described as consisting of perception,
understanding, reasoning, and choice.98 One making a “rational” decision should have at least
minimally intact ability to perceive the world accurately; think coherently about those
perceptions and thereby form valid understandings; run those understandings through a sound
reasoning process guided by personally relevant goals; imagine a conclusion logically flowing
from that process; express that conclusion to others; and formulate and execute a course of action
flowing logically from the preceding steps.99 Each of these steps is both theoretically and
practically complex (and a potential site for things to go awry).

PERSPECTIVES ON JUDGMENT AND DECISION RESEARCH (Sandra L. Schneider & James Shanteau eds., 2003);
JUDGMENT AND DECISION MAKING: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY READER (Terry Connolly et al. eds., 2d ed. 2000);
RESEARCH ON JUDGMENT AND DECISION MAKING: CURRENTS, CONNECTIONS, AND CONTROVERSIES (William M.
Goldstein & Robin M. Hogarth eds., 1997).
95
See, e.g., Winick, supra note 6, at 966 (it is both tempting and “easy to confuse the quality of the decision-making
process with the reasonableness of the result reached”).
96
See, e.g., Saks & Behnke, supra note 39, at 124 (we should avoid “declaring people who make good choices
competent and people who make bad choices incompetent”). See also Lafferty v. Cook, 949 F.2d 1546, 1566 (10th
Cir. 1992) (Brorby, J., dissenting).
97
See Bonnie, supra note 18, at 575.
98
In the competence context, these abilities generally are grouped under the headings of understanding,
appreciation, reasoning, and choice. See POYTHRESS ET AL., supra note 2, at 48 (“Taken together, these four criteria
operationalize the “rationality” requirement to which the Supreme Court referred in Godinez v. Moran.”). The
MacCAT-CA, designed to reflect this theory of competence, measures only the first three. See id. at 59-68 & Table
3.1. Because I consider appreciation to be an aspect of understanding, see Part II.A., infra, and believe it important
to consider the threshold role of perception, I prefer the formulation of perception, understanding, reasoning, and
choice.
99
See Morse, Rationality and Responsibility, supra note 91, at 255 (offering similar account of rationality in context
of criminal responsibility); Stephen J. Morse, Uncontrollable Urges and Irrational People, 88 VA. L. REV. 1025,
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The extent to which courts have examined defendants’ competence with reference to a
decision-making modelis quite limited. However, certain helpful clues as to such a model’s
utility may be found in the treatment of defendants with severe thought disorder.
To simplify a somewhat confusing nomenclature, “thought disorder” refers herein to
dysfunction in cognitive thought processes that is identified by its effect on either the content or
form of speech.100 A disorder of “thought content” generally will include hallucinations (sensory
perceptions not based in reality, for example, hearing voices or seeing visions) or delusions
(understandings and beliefs similarly unrelated to reality).101 One of “thought form” describes a
“disorganization of underlying thought processes indicated by abnormal speech,” for example,

1067 (2002); Saks & Behnke, supra note 39, at 114 (competence to consent to medical treatment requires
“understanding relevant information; assessing the evidence and forming appropriate beliefs about it; reasoning
about the evidence with a degree of intactness; and communicating a choice”); Appelbaum, supra note 33, at 379
(“competence for decision making” consists of “the abilities: to express a choice; to understand relevant
information; to appreciate the significance of that information for one’s own situation; and to reason with relevant
information so as to engage in a logical process of weighing options”) (citing Jessica W. Berg et al., Constructing
Competence: Formulating Standards of Legal Competence to Make Medical Decisions, 48 RUTGERS L. REV. 345
(1996)). See also G. Michelle Reid-Proctor et al., Evaluation of legal competency in patients with frontal lobe
injury, 15 BRAIN INJURY 377, 378 (2001) (components of legal “competency” are “(a) perception and
comprehension of a relevant body [of] information; (b) memory and recall of relevant information well enough to
support further mental evaluation of the informant; (c) the capacity to identify personal options implicit in the
information and to logically deliberate among the available options based on relative potential risks and benefits;
and (d) the capacity to make an enduring decision based on prior logical deliberation”).
100
Thought disorder, thus defined, is a type of dysfunction generally occurring “within the context of a more
extensive psychopathology, including diagnoses as diverse as schizophrenia, mood disorders, certain personality
disorders, and autism.” Peter Bachman & Tyrone D. Cannon, Cognitive and Neuroscience Aspects of Thought
Disorder, in THE CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF THINKING AND REASONING, supra note 93, at 494. This definition is
not entirely consistent with that of “formal thought disorder,” which historically has been defined as the speech
impairment itself rather than the underlying cause. The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders
acknowledges the “difficulty inherent in developing an objective definition of ‘thought disorder’” and therefore
focuses in its description of schizophrenia on the concept of “disorganized speech.” DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL
MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 300 (4th ed. 2000) (hereinafter “DSM-IV-TR”). However, the speech disorders
typical of thought disorder are best regarded as symptoms of underlying defects in cognitive processing. See
Bachman & Cannon, supra, at 493, 495, 498; see also DSM-IV-TR, supra, at 300 (citing “formal thought disorder”
as referring to “disorganized thinking”).
101
The DSM-IV-TR, supra note 100, at 299, defines delusions as disorders of thought content, while characterizing
hallucinations as disorders of perception.
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highly tangential speech (sometimes called a “flight of ideas”) or the confusing jumble of loose
associations sometimes called “word salad.”102
Persons with severe thought disorder, particularly those diagnosed with schizophrenia,
often are labeled “psychotic,”103 and psychosis is very strongly associated with findings of
adjudicative incompetence.104 Indeed, it appears that many examiners regard psychosis as the
sine qua non of incompetence, starting and ending their analysis with that diagnosis.105
Unfortunately, the underlying rationale as to why the thought disorder associated with psychosis
is thought to disrupt Dusky rationality seldomis made plain. Indeed, few courts have attempted
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Bachman & Cannon, supra note 100, at 495-96; see also DSM-IV-TR, supra note 100, at 300 (describing such
disturbances of speech within schizophrenia). Cases that explicitly discuss the “disordered thought form”
manifestation are scarce. However, it is not unusual to see embedded within cases descriptions of bizarre speech
that suggest the presence of disordered thought form. For example, the defendant in Strickland v. Francis exhibited
various forms of nonsensical speech, including repeated and acontextual use of the word “supplemental,” evidencing
“’a certain disorganization of thought process.’” 738 F.2d 1542, 1544-45 n.3 (11th Cir. 1984); see also United
States v. Hemsi, 901 F.2d 293, 294 (2d Cir. 1990) (incompetent defendant’s testimony was “rambling, confused,
irrelevant, or incomprehensible,” at one point devolving into “a profane and scatological barrage”); State v.
Haycock, 766 A.2d 720, 722-23 (N.H. 2001) (defendant tended to “ramble” and his “thoughts” were “’tangential’
and ‘paranoid’”). Cf. United States v. Housh, 89 F. Supp.2d 1227, 1230 (D. Kan. 2000) (noting, in support of
competency finding, that defendant’s “speech was normal in content and form”); Gov’t of Virgin Islands v. Charles,
72 F.3d 401, 405-09 & n.2 (3d Cir. 1995) (paranoid schizophrenic defendant’s record colloquies were “rambling”
but not entirely “incoherent”; he was deemed competent, including to represent himself and reject an insanity
defense). Though the cases do not make this clear, a thought-form disorder could impair the communication with
counsel prong of Dusky as well as the rational understanding of the proceedings prong.
103
See DSM-IV-TR, supra note 100, at 297-98 (offering varied definitions of psychosis and psychotic symptoms, all
of which include delusions or hallucinations, some of which include disorganized speech and behavior); Bachman &
Cannon, supra note 100, at 500 (psychosis “involves a fundamental ‘loosening of associations’ between ideational
elements, which results in a conceptual confusion that manifests itself in disordered speech (in addition to other
symptoms)”).
Note that what this Article defines as “thought disorder” may also be found in non-psychotic mental
illnesses, such as amnesia, delirium, and dementia. See DSM-IV-TR, supra note 100, at 135-80. These phenomena
also may be highly relevant to an adjudicative competence determination. See, e.g., United States v. Rinchack, 820
F.2d 1557, 1569 (11th Cir. 1987); United States v. Borum, 464 F.2d 896, 900 (10th Cir. 1972); Wilson v. United
States, 391 F.2d 460, 463-64 (D.C. Cir. 1968). While these issues go beyond the purview of this Article, the
methodological approach advocated in this Part applies equally to such mental disorders.
104
See Jodi L. Viljoen et al., Diagnosis, Current Symptomatology, and the Ability to Stand Trial, 3 J. FORENSIC
PSYCHOL. PRAC. 23, 23-25, 30 (2003) (no non-psychotic individual in sample deemed incompetent, while nearly
20% of the psychotic defendants were; “research has consistently found that defendants with psychotic disorders are
more likely to be judged unfit than those with non-psychotic disorders,” and “hallucinations and delusions” are
particularly associated with such judgments); see also Hoge et al., supra note 83, at 331 (findings of incompetence
generally associated with diagnosis of schizophrenia with presence of psychotic symptoms); GRISSO, supra note 13,
at 79.
105
See, e.g., Liles v. Saffle, 945 F.2d 333, 339 (10th Cir. 1991) (examiner “was of the belief that only psychotic
individuals could be considered competent, and any individual who was non-psychotic was therefore competent”).
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to define Dusky rational understanding at all, let alone by reference to decision-making
processes.106 There are, however, several prominent exceptions.
Those courtsthat have attempted to explain the relevance of psychosis to adjudicative
competence generally have located the operative decision-making defects at the stages of
perception and understanding. Perception, or the human body’s transformation of sensory
stimuli into internal images,107 is a crucial threshold requirement,108 but is not as straightforward
as it may seem. Because sensory stimuli are transformed into conscious perceptions by complex
(and largely nonconscious) neural processes, factors ranging from stress to neurological disorder
can intervene, with sometimes seriously distorting consequences, between percept and
perception.109 Once an object is perceived, with or without prior distortion, a decider will form
thoughts and beliefs—or understandings—about it.110 Generally accurate understandings about
relevant aspects of the external world are, like perception, necessary but not sufficient for
competent decision-making.111

106

See, e.g,. Housh, 89 F. Supp.2d at 1229 (“few reported Tenth Circuit cases have given meaning to the ‘rational
understanding’ phraseology used by the Dusky Court”).
107
William M. Goldstein & Robin M. Hogarth, Judgment and decision research: Some historical context, in
RESEARCH IN JUDGMENT AND DECISION MAKING, supra note 94, at 3, 7 (perception is the process by which objects
in the environment stimulate a person’s sensory organs “to produce multiple cues … as to the object’s identity and
properties”).
108
It is hard to imagine a competent defendant who lacks anything approaching normal perceptive abilities; we
would not, for example, consider trying a comatose person. Perceptive deficits short of coma may also cause
incompetence. Theon Jackson, for example, who was deaf and could not speak, was considered incompetent in
large part because his disabilities were so extreme as to forestall any communication with counsel. See Jackson, 406
U.S. at 717-18 (noting as well that Jackson was developmentally disabled) Though one imagines that a defendant
like Jackson could now be rendered competent because of improved methods for communicating with the
developmentally disabled and hearing impaired, it is possible to imagine a defendant for whom no accommodation
is sufficient.
109
See, e.g., Goldstein & Hogarth, supra note 107, at 7 (perception involves “the psychological construction or
inference of a percept from an incomplete and fallible collection of sensory cues”).
110
“Thinking,” or “the systematic transformation of mental representations of knowledge to characterize actual or
possible states of the world, often in service of goals,” is a bridge between perception and understanding. Holyoak
& Morrison, supra note 93, at 2 (emphasis omitted); see also id. at 1.
111
Recall that Dusky could understand of the parameters of his situation and relate with accuracy certain relevant
facts. See Dusky, 271 F.2d at 389. See also Saks & Behnke, supra note 39, at 113 (“Pure understanding” necessary
but not sufficient; because “making a decision in one’s best interests requires assessing how those interests are likely
to be affected, the patient must be able to form adequate beliefs in order to be a competent decision maker”).
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Defendants with severe psychosis frequently display perceptual and understanding
processes that are so profoundly distorted as to obviate competence. Such was the conclusion in
Lafferty v. Cook,112 an unusually thoughtful decision by a sharply split Tenth Circuit panel.
Ronald Lafferty was diagnosed as suffering from a “paranoid delusional state” but deemed
competent; he then attempted suicide by hanging, and four examinersopined that Lafferty’s
“paranoid delusional system,” aggravated by oxygen deprivation to his brain, had rendered him
incompetent by impairing “his ability to perceive and interpret reality.”113 Lafferty’s delusions
included the strong belief that all those involved in his case—including his lawyer—were part of
a “man-made corrupt order” against which he was required by God to rebel. Because he
displayed factual understanding of the proceedings,114 the majority recognized that its task was to
determine the meaning of Dusky’s rational understanding requirement.115 After examining the
trial record in Dusky the majority determined that “a defendant lacks the requisite rational
understanding if his mental condition precludes him from perceiving accurately, interpreting,
and/or responding appropriately to the world around him.”116 Thus, the majority concluded,
“sufficient contact with reality” is the “touchstone for ascertaining the existence of a rational
understanding.”117

112

949 F.2d 1546 (10th Cir. 1992). Lafferty, a former Mormon who was excommunicated from the Church of
Latter-Day Saints for “unorthodox religious views,” murdered several persons whom he believed had supported his
wife in leaving him.
113
Id. at 1552.
114
Like Dusky, Lafferty “physically knew the nature of the proceedings against him, and their possible
consequences.” Id.
115
Id. at 1550 (“The aspect of the Dusky standard that is the critical focus of attention in this case is the requirement
that a defendant have a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him.”).
116
Id. at 1551.
117
Id. (“The state court paid lip service to Dusky’s requirement that competency requires a rational understanding
which is different from, and more than, factual understanding. … Nonetheless, in view of the evidence that
Lafferty’s illness interfered with his accurate perception of reality, the court’s statements that Lafferty’s
understanding was rational simply renders that requirement a nullity.”).
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This test, focused primarily on the effects of psychosis on perception and understanding,
has been adopted bya small handful of other courts.

118

In In re Heidnik, for example, the Third

Circuit found a death row inmate incompetent to abandon appeals119 because his decisions were
based on a flawed “perception of reality,”120 including “fixed false beliefs” that his victims had
killed themselves and that his execution would lead to the end of capital punishment. These
delusional beliefs were “all-encompassing in nature” and colored “every aspect of his cognitive
functioning,”121 with the result that Heidnik was “seeing people as other than what they are.”122
A similar approach was recently taken as well in Utah v. Mitchell, in which Brian David Mitchell
was found incompetent to stand trial for the kidnapping of Salt Lake City teenager Elizabeth
Smart.123 After determining that Mitchell suffered from a delusional disorder characterized by
fixed, false beliefs (including that Smart was destined to be his “celestial wife” and that God
required his conviction and imprisonment in order to trigger an eventual personal battle with the
Antichrist),124 the court concluded that his “ability to accurately perceive and interpret external
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The Second Circuit, in a pre-Lafferty decision, agreed that a defendant’s “impaired sense of reality” can, where it
prevents him from “focusing on his legal needs and acting effectively on his intellectual understanding” of his
position, cause him to be unable to “make any rational decisions regarding the defense.” United States v. Hemsi,
901 F.2d 293, 295-96 (2d Cir. 1990). See also Bryan v. Gibson, 276 F.3d 1163, 1170 (10th Cir. 2001) (aff’d in part
and vacated in part by Bryan v. Mullin, 335 F.3d 1207 (10th Cir. 2003)); Housh, 89 F. Supp.2d at 1229; State v.
Haycock, 766 A.2d 720, 722 (N.H. 2001); Wilcoxson v. State, 22 S.W.3d 289, 305 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1999). Cf.
Valdez v. Ward, 219 F.3d 1222, 1241 (10th Cir. 2000).
119
In re Heidnik, 112 F.3d 105, 111 n.6 (3d Cir. 1997) (per curiam) (“Lafferty is in accord with our distinction
between factual and rational understanding”). The competence relevant to appointment of a next friend is a
dominant frame through which the competence of severely depressed prisoners is measured. Because the Rees v.
Peyton test refers specifically to defects in a death-row inmate’s “premises,” 384 U.S. at 314, it is particularly likely
that courts faced with a Rees challenge will focus on pre-reasoning defects in factual premises. This point is
explored further in Part II.B.1., infra.
120
112 F.3d at 109 & n.4.
121
Id. at 109.
122
Id. at 110.
123
Utah v. Mitchell, No. 031901884 (Third Judicial District Court, Memorandum of Judge Judith S. Atherton, dated
July 26, 2005).
124
Two prominent forensic theorists, Jennifer Skeem and Stephen Golding, found Mitchell to be suffering from a
delusional disorder that obviated adjudicative competence. See Mitchell, supra note 123, at 25, 32-33. Much of
their evaluations, and the court’s, centered on the difficult issue of distinguishing between a fixed delusional belief
system and religious beliefs that, though unconventional, are properly regarded as non-delusional and even
protected. This same issue was presented in Lafferty, which also concerned a Utah defendant who had been
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reality” was unduly impaired.125 The court therefore found him unable to make rational choices,
which it equated with the “rational understanding” required by both Utah law and Dusky.126
Thus, as these cases demonstrate, severe defects in perception and understanding can impede a
defendant’s ability to make decisions on his own behalf.
Defects in reasoning—the process by which one draws inferences and conclusions from
premises127—also can defeat competence. Flaws in logical reasoning are perhaps the most
obvious and intuitive examples of irrationality; for example, were a defendant to understand (and
believe) that all defense attorneys are their clients’ advocates, and that the person assigned to
represent her is a defense attorney, and yet conclude that her defense attorney is the state’s
advocate, we might well conclude that her logical reasoning powers are impaired. Significantly,
though, such defects seldom are reflected in the cases; instead, as the above cases demonstrate, at
least with regard to psychotic defendants courts have found incompetence despite intact logical
capacity. This makes sense: while deductive reasoning is a necessary component for
competence,128 it is far from sufficient, for such reasoning maps quitepoorly onto real -world
decision-making, in which the validity of premises matters and where decisional conditions are

removed from the Church of Latter-Day Saints. This issue, as well as that of defendants with potentially
“delusional” political beliefs and motivations, warrants a far more careful explication than is possible here.
125
Mitchell, supra note 123, at 58 (citing to Lafferty). The court continued: “Since having the capacity to
realistically determine what is in one’s own best interest is nothing more or less than having the ability to make
reasoned, rational choices, it follows from the court’s conclusion that because Defendant’s religious belief system is
the basis upon which he makes decisions concerning his criminal case, he also lacks the capacity to consult with
counsel with a reasonable degree of rational understanding and is … incompetent to stand trial.” Id.
126
Utah law, while largely parroting Dusky, also spells out in more detail the precise abilities subsumed under the
general standard, and in those sections it articulates that a defendant must be able to “engage in reasoned choice of
legal strategies and options.” UTAH CODE ANN. §77-15-5(4)(a)(i)-(vii) (2005). The Mitchell court reasoned that
because Godinez rejected any distinction between “reasoned choice” and “rational understanding,” the rational
understanding standard incorporates the ability to make rational decisions about one’s criminal case. Mitchell, supra
note 123, at 5 n.2. See Part I.A, supra.
127
See, e.g., Holyoak & Morrison, supra note 93, at 3.
128
Saks & Behnke, supra note 39, at 109 n.8 & 113 (to be competent one “must also be able to reason with some
degree of intactness. Reasoning allows one to put together the relevant information one has purely understood and,
having assessed, has formed beliefs about.”).
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often confusing and in flux.129 Flexible reasoning—which requires fluid intelligence, ability to
use deductive and inductive reasoning as appropriate, and incorporation of background goals,
knowledge, and learning—provides a more appropriate model for the reasoning process
underlying the pragmatic, real-world decision-making faced by criminal defendants.130 Thus,
though Lafferty’s reasoning was logical—his conclusions and decisions, such as a desire to
discharge counsel and refrain from presenting an insanity defense, were consistent with his
premises—the court found it dispositive that delusional beliefs irredeemably distorted his
premises.131
The extent to which courts have identified competence-threatening defects in choice—
including the component steps of formulating a conclusion, expressing that conclusion, and
taking action accordingly—is limited. Choice warrants separate articulation,132 as it is possible
that a defendant might display valid reasoning on the basis of sound premises and yet reach a

129

Jonathan St. B. T. Evans, Deductive Reasoning, in THE CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF THINKING AND REASONING,
supra note 93, at 169, 169, 175, 179, 181 (it “is no longer appropriate to equate performance on deductive reasoning
tasks with rationality” or to assume that logic provides an appropriate normative account of everyday, real world
reasoning”).
130
See Steven A. Sloman & David A. Lagnado, The Problem of Induction, in THE CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF
THINKING AND REASONING, supra note 93, at 95-97 (like deductive reasoning, inductive reasoning “concerns the
logical relations that hold between statements irrespective of their truth or falsity. In the case of inductive logic,
however, these relations admit of varying strengths, a conditional probability measure reflecting the rational degree
of belief that someone should have in a hypothesis given the available evidence.”); Keith J. Holyoak, Analogy, in
THE CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF THINKING AND REASONING, supra note 93, at 117, 118 (“fluid intelligence” is the
ability to reason with novel information).
131
Lafferty, 949 F.2d at 1554-55 (“This court cannot accept as consistent with Dusky and its progeny a finding of
competency made under the view that a defendant who is unable to accurately perceive reality due to a paranoid
delusional system need only act consistently with his paranoid delusion to be considered competent to stand trial.”);
see also In re Heidnik, 112 F.3d at 111 (Heidnik incompetent despite his “considerable intelligence and expressive
powers”). These courts rejected as sufficient what Kahneman and Frederick describe as “coherence rationality,” or
“the strict conception that requires the agent’s entire system of beliefs and preferences to be internally consistent and
immune to the effects of framing and context.” Daniel Kahneman & Shane Frederick, A Model of Heuristic
Judgment, in THE CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF THINKING AND REASONING, supra note 93, at 267, 277.
132
Though heavily reliant on the prior stages, choice additionally requires “assessment of the value of an option or
the probability that it will yield a certain payoff (judgment) coupled with choice among alternatives (decision
making),” as well as “construction of a course of action that can achieve a goal.” Holyoak & Morrison, supra note
93, at 2.
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conflicting or somehow irrational conclusion,133 lack ability to communicate her choices,134 or be
unable to act in accordance with her choices. For example, the record indicates that Lafferty
may have had additional defects in this domain, as he had chosen to discharge counsel but was
unable to take action implementing that choice. For reasons that he apparently would not
explain, Lafferty refused to put his expressed desire to represent himself on the record in the
required form, with the result that counsel was not discharged.135
The Lafferty, In re Heidnik, and Mitchell decisions represent some of the only examples
of an overt attempt by the courts to define rational understanding, let alone an attempt to do so
by reference to an articulation of the affected stages of a rational decision-making process. This
approach is far from uncontroversial. The dissenting judge in Lafferty, for example, took strong
issue with what he saw as the majority’s misguided “quest to articulate the one true legal
definition of competency.”136 Such criticism, though, is overcome by the significant advantages
of a transparent and finely-grained approach. In the case of psychosis incorporating delusional
perception and understanding, one clear benefit of locating the site of dysfunction and teasing
out its effect is avoidance of, on the one hand, overinclusion attending simplistic equation of
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For example, a defendant who believes that she will be punished by God for escaping a jail term might conclude
that it is in her best interest to reject a plea offer, despite her ability to reason through why the offer is otherwise in
her best interest. The belief is a factor that intervenes between the preliminary conclusion (it is good to take the
offer) and the ultimate conclusion (it is bad to take the offer). Clearly, these stages of judgment and decisionmaking overlap heavily. See, e.g., Holyoak & Morrison, supra note 93, at 3.
134
For example, because of his communication deficits Theon Jackson would not have been able to express a choice
as to the course of his defense even had he the ability to arrive at one. See Jackson, 406 U.S. at 718-19.
135
See 949 F.2d at 1549.
136
Id. at 1557-58 (Brorby, J., dissenting). In the dissent’s view, the finding of competence was adequately grounded
in record evidence of Lafferty’s intellectual functioning and the prosecution’s expert testimony offering “a generally
functional view of rationality centering on whether a person can piece things together, see relationship between
incidents, remember information, and thereby factually and theoretically assist in his defense.” Id. at 1566. Cf.
Kansas v. Barnes, 948 P.2d 617 (Sup. Ct. Kan. 1997) (expert reports of defendant’s delusions and paranoia
overcome by evidence that he “had comprehension of the roles of the various participants in the trial,” understood
the charges and possible consequences, and “was able to respond appropriately in court and cooperate with his
attorney”).
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psychosis with incompetence137 and, on the other, underinclusion attending simplistic reliance on
logic as the sine qua non of competence.138 But the methodological benefits go even further, as
thought-content disorders are not the only sort to warrant such an articulation; these may just be
the easiest cases. A defendant like Mitchell may be relatively easy to identify should he choose
to verbalize his beliefs, delusional by any objective standard. Certainly other, possibly less
obvious, disorders might have equivalent impact. These cases therefore are valuable also
because they model an approach that can be applied to other disorders, including—as the next
Part proposes—emotional disorders.
As this Part has shown, then, a model of human decision-making—even a basic one such
as that offered here—incorporates a number of complex underlying concepts, each of which
represents a site of potentially competence-threatening “irrationality.”139 In the case of
psychosis, the most endangered sites appear to be perception and understanding, though defects
at that stage also will frustrate flexible reasoning and potentially destabilize choice. Perhaps not
surprisingly, then, despite controversy over methodology, the conclusion that severe impairment
to a defendant’s cognitive processes—particularly that associated with thought-content
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Consider the following “telling colloquy”: “Judge: Doctor, is he incompetent? Psychiatrist: Judge, he is
psychotic!” Burt & Morris, supra note 11, at 92 & n. 109; see also John Monahan, Foreword, in ROESCH &
GOLDING, supra note 6, at v (noting “the inadequacy of the psychiatrist’s answer” and “the inefficacy of the judge’s
question”). For example, were a psychotic defendant’s delusional thinking limited to the belief that she is actually a
Russian princess, such belief may or may not have any effect on ability to protect her interests in a criminal
proceeding, particularly if her notions as to the relevant facts and law comport closely to those relevant to one who
is not a Russian princess. Similarly, were her psychosis limited to occasional auditory hallucinations that did not
touch on the subject matter of the trial or cause her to become confused, distracted, or inappropriate in conversations
with her attorney or during trial, they may not threaten competence.
138
See, e.g., Lafferty, 949 F.2d at 1557-58 (Brorby, J., dissenting); see also Rumbaugh v. Procunier, 753 F.2d 395,
404 (5th Cir. 1985) (Goldberg, J., dissenting).
139
Of course, many irrational and nonrational processes, such as reliance on common heuristics and biases, might
threaten normative “rationality” in an important sense and yet not signal incompetence. See Part III, infra.

30

Emotional Competence, Rational Understanding, and the Criminal Defendant
disorder—can defeat the presumption of competence is reflected in a number of cases.140 It also
has been urged by scholars writing in the area of competence to consent to medical treatment.141
Largely missing from this traditional account of decision-making and its relevance to
adjudicative competence, however, is the influence of emotion. Defendants with profound
impairments of emotional perception, processing, and expression may be equally impaired in
ability to make self-interested rational decisions, although they may appear to be in touch with
reality in a way that psychotic persons often do not. That is the subject of the following Part.
II.

Emotional Competence and Rational Understanding

As the preceding Part explained, the key to Dusky rational understanding is whether a
criminal defendant is capable of making defendant-driven decisions—such as whether to plead
guilty, discharge counsel, raise an insanity defense, present mitigating evidence, and challenge or
acquiesce to her conviction and sentence—with recourse to at least minimally intact rational
decision-making processes. Such a determination requires a highly particularized inquiry into
whether the defendant’s perception and understanding of relevant aspects of the world are
accurate; whether she is able to engage in appropriately flexible reasoning; and whether she can
formulate, express, maintain, and implement choices. Such a determination should be made in
light of the specific demands of the criminal case, with an eye always toward whether the
defendant’s decision-making capacities permit her to hold up her end of a highly adversarial
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See Singleton v. Norris, 319 F.3d 1018, 1032-33 (8th Cir. 2003) (Heaney, C.J., dissenting); Strickland v. Francis,
738 F.2d 1542, 1546, 1551 (11th Cir. 1984) (“Strickland was out of touch with reality and totally incapable of
assisting in his defense”; he “suffered from delusional characteristics and had psychotic disorders that made it
difficult for him to deal with reality”); Bruce v. Estelle, 536 F.2d 1051, 1063 (5th Cir. 1976) (defendant’s
schizophrenia “caused him to misperceive important elements of the proceedings”).
141
See Saks & Behnke, supra note 39, at 116-17, 119, 123 (“Accurate beliefs about the world are essential to
competency, because decisions take effect in the world. … we propose … a ‘patently false delusional belief’
standard. Patently false delusional beliefs are ones that are grossly improbable” because they “violate the laws of
nature,” are “practically impossible,” or represent “a gross distortion of obvious facts”; “[r]eligious and cultural
beliefs are exempted” from this purview.”); Bonnie, supra note 18, at 573-74 (“delusional” defendants who make
“irrational” decisions are decisionally incompetent because their reasons lack “a plausible grounding in reality”).
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proceeding. Before the defendant is found incompetent on the basis of a flaw at any decisionmaking juncture, an examiner or court should be able to articulate the origin of that fault and
explain how it is thought to disrupt rationality.
All evidence suggests that no such approach is being implemented. Because judicial
determinations almost always rest entirely on the recommendation of experts, and because those
experts generally do not explain either their methodology or the basis for their conclusions, it is
very difficult to know what underlies most adjudicative competence decisions.142 But to the
extent that examiners and courts sometimes reveal their conception of the distinction between a
“rational” and “factual” understanding, it appears clear that the generally operative concept of
Dusky rationality is focused almost entirely on disordered cognitive processes, such as those seen
in thought disorder. The role of emotional disorder, though sometimes mentioned, remains
almost entirely unexplored.143 Indeed, it is sometimes deliberately disregarded.
This Part, then, seeks to articulate, with reference to the decision-making model
presented in Part I, the theoretical underpinnings of an adjudicative competence standard that
incorporates a sophisticated understanding of emotion. The two examples it explores, depression
and brain damage, represent two situations in which severe emotional dysfunction might disrupt
the rational decision-making capacity demanded by Dusky but to which a purely cognitive
approach is particularly ill-suited.
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See, e.g., GRISSO, supra note 13, at 79 (“Little is known empirically about the methods that clinicians actually
use in collecting data for competence to stand trial determinations.”).
143
Like the distinction between cognition and emotion, see pp. 35-36 infra, thatbetween a thought disorder and an
emotional disorder is overly simplified. Many mental illnesses in which thought disorder plays a prominent role—
for example, schizophrenia—commonly also have affective elements, such as blunted affect. See DSM-IV-TR,
supra note 100, at 299. Similarly, affective disorders—such as clinical depression—commonly entail cognitive
deficits. See id. at 349. But these distinctions between and among disorders reflect that certain dysfunctions are
more about one than the other, which is part of how they are clinically distinguished.
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A. The Role of Emotion in Decision-Making
Emotion is implicated in decision-making processes at many, or perhaps all, of the
junctures described in the previous Part.144 Its role, however, historically has been both
underexplored and undervalued.145 As a result, emotion is more poorly understood than are the
various cognitive mechanisms underlying human decision-making. Fortunately, this situation is
changing rapidly.146 But despite these advances, no concerted effort has been made to tie
contemporary emotion research into the formulation of competence-relevant decision-making.147
Because of emotion’s importance, such an effort is vital.

144

See Leda Cosmides & John Tooby, Evolutionary Psychology and the Emotions, in HANDBOOK OF EMOTIONS 91,
93 (Michael Lewis & Jeanette M. Haviland-Jones eds., 2d ed. 2000) (emotion’s function is “to direct the activities
and interactions of the subprograms governing perception; attention; inference; learning; memory; goal choice;
motivational priorities; categorization and conceptual frameworks; physiological reactions …; reflexes; behavioral
decision rules; motor systems; communication processes; energy level and effort allocation; affective coloration of
events and stimuli; recalibration of probability estimates, situation assessments, values, and regulatory variables …
and so on.”); Nicole A. Roberts et al., The impact of orbital prefrontal cortex damage on emotional activation to
unanticipated and anticipated acoustic startle stimuli, 4 COGNITIVE, AFFECTIVE, & BEHAV. NEUROSCIENCE 307,
316 (2004) (“deviations in emotional response” in certain brain-damaged patients “can be expected to have an
adverse impact on such cognitive processes as attention, learning, memory, and decision making, all of which are
profoundly influenced by emotional reactions”).
145
Ola Svenson, Values, Affect, and Processes in Human Decision Making: A Differentiation and Consolidation
Theory Perspective, in EMERGING PERSPECTIVES ON JUDGMENT AND DECISION MAKING RESEARCH, supra note 94,
at 287, 296 (“[T]he very strong emphasis on cognitive functions in decision research during the past few decades
has led to neglect of the roles of affect, emotional involvement, and affective components in decision processes.”);
Melissa L. Finucane et al., Judgment and Decision Making: The Dance of Affect and Reason, in EMERGING
PERSPECTIVES ON JUDGMENT AND DECISION RESEARCH, supra note 94, at 327, 329 (“Affect has … rarely been
recognized as an important component in research and theory in judgment and decision making.”); Alice M. Isen &
Aparna A. Labroo, Some Ways in Which Positive Affect Facilitates Decision Making and Judgment, in EMERGING
PERSPECTIVES ON JUDGMENT AND DECISION RESEARCH, supra note 94, at 365, 367 (“the field of decision making
has been slow to incorporate research on affect”).
146
See Svenson, supra note 145, at 289 (“decision researchers are becoming increasingly interested in the effects of
emotion and affect on human decision processes”); Isen & Labroo, supra note 145, at 366. An overview of the
study of emotion is beyond the scope of this Article. See generally HANDBOOK OF EMOTIONS, supra note 144. For
developments within psychology, see EMOTIONS: ESSAYS ON EMOTION THEORY (Stephanie H.M. van Goozen et al.
eds., 1994); RICHARD S. LAZARUS, EMOTION AND ADAPTATION (1991); ANDREW ORTONY ET AL., THE COGNITIVE
STRUCTURE OF EMOTIONS (1988); APPROACHES TO EMOTION (Klaus R. Scherer & Paul Ekman eds., 1984); 1
THEORIES OF EMOTION: EMOTION, THEORY, RESEARCH, AND EXPERIENCE (Robert Plutchik & Henry Kellerman
eds., 1980); in the neural sciences, see HANDBOOK OF AFFECTIVE SCIENCES (Richard J. Davidson et al. eds., 2003);
COGNITIVE NEUROSCIENCE OF EMOTION (Richard D. Lane & Lynn Nadel eds., 2000); ANTONIO DAMASIO, THE
FEELING OF WHAT HAPPENS: BODY AND EMOTION IN THE MAKING OF CONSCIOUSNESS (1999); LEDOUX, supra note
1; ANTONIO R. DAMASIO, DESCARTES’ ERROR: EMOTION, REASON, AND THE HUMAN BRAIN (1994).
147
The one instance in which such a connection has been urged is within a small debate in the area of capacity to
consent to medical treatment. See Charland, supra note 85; Louis C. Charland, Is. Mr. Spock Mentally Competent?
Competence to Consent and Emotion, 5 PHILOSOPHY, PSYCHIATRY, & PSYCHOL. 67 (1998); Ruth Chadwick,
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The first task is to define emotion, which is used here as an umbrella term encompassing
the concepts of emotion, feelings, mood, and affect.148 Theorists generally agree on the
existence of certain “core” emotions—including fear, anger, happiness, sadness, surprise, and
disgust—a repertoire on which humans demonstrate many variations.149 “Affect” refers to the
positive or negative quality of a feeling-state, but is used also to describe the manner in which a
person externalizes feeling-states—for example, one whose facial expressions appear to display
no emotion is said to have a “flat affect.”150 “Mood” refers to feeling-states—such as anxiety
and depression—that are “more transient, diffuse, and less attributable to particular sources” than
emotions.151
Fundamentally, each of these aspects of emotion is thought to be in important respects
both separate and separable from “cognition,”152 which refers generally to intellectual or
“thinking” processes (including many that operate below the level of consciousness) not
Commentary on “Is Mr. Spock Mentally Competent?,” 5 PHILOSOPHY, PSYCHIATRY, & PSYCHOL. 83 (1998); Carl
Elliot; Commentary on “Is Mr. Spock Mentally Competent?,” 5 PHILOSOPHY, PSYCHIATRY, & PSYCHOL. 87 (1998);
Stuart J. Younger, Commentary on “Is Mr. Spock Mentally Competent?,” 5 PHILOSOPHY, PSYCHIATRY, & PSYCHOL.
89 (1998); Louis C. Charland, Response to the Commentaries, 5 PHILOSOPHY, PSYCHIATRY, & PSYCHOL. 93 (1998);
see also Part III, infra.
148
See Terry A. Maroney, Law and Emotion: A Proposed Taxonomy of an Emerging Field, __ LAW & HUM.
BEHAV. __, __ & n.36 (forthcoming 2006) (using similar definition). For a treatment of definitional debates within
emotion theory, see generally THE NATURE OF EMOTION: FUNDAMENTAL QUESTIONS 3, 51 (Paul Ekman & Richard
J. Davidson eds., 1994).
149
However, multiple taxonomies of the emotions have been offered, with very different lineups. See, e.g., ROBERT
PLUTCHIK, EMOTION: A PSYCHOEVOLUTIONARY THESIS (1980) (eight basic emotions); James A. Russell, A
Circumplex Model of Affect, 39 J. PERSONALITY & SOCIAL PSYCHOL. 1161 (1980) (four).
150
See, e.g., THE NATURE OF EMOTION, supra note 148, at 49-96, 184, 199; Paul Slovic, What’s Fear Got to Do with
It? It’s Affect We Need to Worry About, 69 MO. L. REV. 971, 971, 989 (2004); Finucane et al., supra note 145, at
328. Affect is sometimes also used in the global sense here proposed for “emotion.” See Jeremy A. Blumenthal,
Does Mood Influence Moral Judgment? An Empirical Test with Legal and Policy Implications, 29 LAW & PSYCHOL.
REV. 1 (2005).
151
See Blumenthal, supra note 150, at 3; Finucane et al., supra note 145, at 328; Richard J. Davidson, On Emotion,
Mood, and Related Affective Concepts, in THE NATURE OF EMOTION, supra note 148, at 51.
152
See, e.g., Gerald L. Clore, For Love or Money: Some Emotional Foundations of Rationality, 80 CHI.-KENT L.
REV. 1151, 1153 (2005) (“If cognition is about tr uth and falsity and is concerned with categorization, then emotion
is about goodness and badness and is concerned with evaluation.”); Carroll E. Izard, Cognition Is One of Four Types
of Emotion-Activating Systems, in THE NATURE OF EMOTION, supra note 148, at 203, 204 (“Emotion is about
motivation, cognition about knowledge.”); Daniel M.T. Fessler et al., Angry men and disgusted women: An
evolutionary approach to the influence of emotions on risk taking, 95 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION
PROCESSES 107,118 (2004) (“emotions constitute a relatively autonomous channel of influence on decision making,
operating in conjunction with, but largely independent of, more strictly cognitive processes”).
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necessarily imbued with emotional content.153 In recent years most emotion theorists have come
to agree that this dividing line is anything but sharp,154 and that many, perhaps all, emotions have
cognitive aspects.155 Nonetheless, the two realms are still helpfully conceptualized separately,
even as we gain a more sophisticated understanding of their interrelatedness.156 Referring to
cognition and emotion as separate—as thinking and feeling—remains so common in both
scientific and colloquial conversation that it retains communicative value. Moreover, as
discussed below, emotion has unique influences that cannot be accounted for, either theoretically
or practically, with cognitive tests.
Historically, to the very limited extent that emotion has been considered within decisionmaking theory it has been regarded solely as a distorting factor whose presence disrupts
rationality.157 This disparaging attitude has been particularly influential within law, in which

153

See, e.g., Cosmides & Tooby, supra note 144, at 98 (“cognitive” abilities consist of “a particular subset of
information-processing—roughly, the effortful, conscious, voluntary, deliberative kind of thinking one does when
solving a mathematics problem or paying chess”); Pheobe C. Ellsworth, Levels of Thought and Levels of Emotion, in
THE NATURE OF EMOTION, supra note 148, at 192, 193 (cognition defined as “sensory information processing,”
“conscious propositional analysis,” or both); Joseph E. LeDoux, Cognitive-Emotional Interactions in the Brain, in
THE NATURE OF EMOTION, supra note 148, at 216 (cognition “is nothing more than a word we use to describe a
group of related but diverse information-processing functions, including sensory processing, perception, imagery,
attention, memory, reasoning, and problem-solving”).
154
See Van Goozen et al, supra note 146, at viii (“One of the liveliest debates in the field of emotions is the relation
between affect and cognition. Some hold that affect determines cognition, others that cognition determines affect.”);
Jeffrey A. Gray, Framework for a Taxonomy of Psychiatric Disorder, in EMOTIONS: ESSAYS IN EMOTION THEORY,
supra note 118, at 29, 30 (there is no brain structure “implicated in the control of emotional behavior that has not
been implicated also in a variety of perceptual, cognitive, and motor functions”); but see Robert B. Zajonc,
Emotional Expression and Temperature Modulation, in EMOTIONS: ESSAYS IN EMOTION THEORY, supra note 118, at
3, 22-23.
155
See, e.g., THE NATURE OF EMOTION, supra note 148, at 179-234; Andrew Ortony et al., THE COGNITIVE
STRUCTURE OF EMOTIONS (1988); Jennifer S. Beer et al., Frontal Lobe Contributions to Executive Control of
Cognitive and Social Behavior, in THE COGNITIVE NEUROSCIENCES III 1091, 1095, 1101 (Michael S. Gazzaniga et
al. eds., 2004). One sense in which this is thought to be so is that emotions are “about” objects in the world. See,
e.g., Clore, supra note 152, at 1159; MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, UPHEAVALS OF THOUGHT: THE INTELLIGENCE OF
EMOTIONS (2001).
156
See LeDoux, supra note 153, at 220-23 (“Knowing these differences sets the stage for examining the links
between the systems.”).
157
See Clore, supra note 152, at 101 (“A long tradition, stretching from classical philosophy to the present, views
passion as the enemy or reason.”); LAZARUS, supra note 118, at 17 (“In the 1950s and 1960s, psychologists were
very interested in the ways in which strong emotions could interfere with rational problem solving and thought.”);
Erin Ryan, The Discourse Beneath: Emotional Epistemology in Legal Deliberation and Negotiation, 10 HARV.
NEGOT. L. REV. 231, 234 (2005); Bruce E. Kaufman, Emotional arousal as a source of bounded rationality, 38 J.
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passion traditionally is cast as the enemy of reason.158 Certain aspects of emotional experience
unquestionably can distort rational decision-making; scholars have largely legitimated the folk
wisdom, reflected in numerous areas of legal doctrine, that emotion can be a powerful and
sometimes disruptive force.159 However, recent developments in emotion theory have made
clear that emotion also can play a positive role.160 Indeed, in recent years a number of legal
theorists have drawn on emotion theory to assert that “emotion in concert with cognition leads to
truer perception and, ultimately to better (more accurate, more moral, more just) decisions.”161
Negative and positive perspectives—both grounded fundamentally in the realization that emotion
cannot be eliminated but instead should be better understood—are equally important to an
examination of emotion’s influence on competence-relevant decision-making.162
Returning to the model of decision-making presented in the preceding Part, emotion has
essentially two types of influence.163 First, emotion represents an important mechanism for the
perception and processing of information, one that captures different information than would
ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 135, 139 (1999); Charland, supra note 85, at 359 (“It is generally agreed that emotions can
influence mental competence negatively. This occurs when they disrupt and impede the cognitive capacities that are
held to underlie competence.”); Isen & Labroo, supra note 145, at 366 (traditionally “affect was considered as an
‘interrupt’ or disruption in an otherwise goal-directed program”); see also id. at 382 (citing recent work that, while
claiming at one point to be “consistent with a view of emotion as beneficial to be person and adaptive,” appears to
assume that intense, negative emotion “derails or overrides thinking and good judgment, and causes people to make
errors, take inappropriate actions, or fail to speak and think clearly”).
158
See Maroney, supra note 148, at ___ & nn. xx-xx (“A core presumption underlying modern legality is that reason
and emotion are different beasts entirely; they belong to separate spheres of human existence; the sphere of law
admits only of reason; and vigilant policing is required to keep emotion from creeping in where it does not
belong.”).
159
Cosmides & Tooby, supra note 144, at 107 (certain events trigger “emotion programs in which the desire to
attempt certain actions should be overwhelming, to the point where the actions are perceived as compulsory,” and
that phenomenon receives cultural recognition in the law of “crimes of passion”).
160
See Van Goozen et al., supra note 146, at x (contemporary “emotion theory views emotional impulses as in some
way adaptive and rational”); Charland, supra note 85, at 359 (“in addition to their negative role, emotions also have
a positive role to play in competence”).
161
Susan A. Bandes, Introduction, in THE PASSIONS OF LAW 1, 7, 11 (Susan A. Bandes ed., 1999); see also Samuel
H. Pillsbury, Emotional Justice: Moralizing the Passions of Criminal Punishment, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 655 (1989)
(critiquing the “myth of dispassion,” which “rests on two fictions: (1) that emotion necessarily leads to injustice, and
(2) that a just decisionmaker is necessarily a dispassionate one”).
162
See, e.g., Isen & Labroo, supra note 145, at 367 (the “realization that affect is a regular part of thought processes
and motivation or processing goals” prompts more “realistic and complex” science).
163
See Svenson, supra note 145, at 297 (emotion’s influence may be procedural or representational); Fessler et al.,
supra note 152, at 108.
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cognition alone.164 Second, emotion affects the perceived value, personal relevance, or
attractiveness of the information being processed, and therefore will shape motivation and
goals.165 These influences can be seen at each stage of decision-making.
First, emotion can influence both which stimuli are perceived and how they are
perceived.166 This is first seen through the mechanism of attention. Because emotionally salient
stimuli tend to be the ones of greatest significance to one’s thriving, they will be attended to
disproportionately.167 Thus, one without recourse to emotion’s guidance will find herself largely
unable to sort effectively among the nearly infinite competitors for her attention. Once a
stimulus is attended to, emotion continues to have an influence. For example, a fearful person
might believe that the shadow of a tree is that of a man wielding a knife, where others would not
perceive such an aggression.168 In such a case, while the common tendency is to describe the
distortion as residing in what the person “thought she saw,” it may also reside one stage earlier:
the emotion has shaped both “what she saw” and what she “thought she saw.” Extremes of
emotion may also influence perceptual recall. In acute cases of trauma, for instance, persons
might become unable to recall the emotionally powerful incident, or instead may recall it so

164

See Ryan, supra note 157, at 232 (“without the information gleaned from the emotional sense that imbues human
interaction and institutions with meaning, our world would seem reduced to hollow shells and randomly-acting
forms”).
165
See, e.g., Clore, supra note 152, at 1164 (“affect serves as information” and “provides information about value”);
)
Robert Nozick, Emotions, in THE EXAMINED LIFE: PHILOSOPHICAL MEDITATIONS 87, 93 & n.*, 96-97 (1990
(emotions provide a “picture of value,” as a type of “analog recording to language’s digital picture of events,” and
thus represents a different way of knowing); Svenson, supra note 145, at 292 (emotion and affect contribute to
evaluations of attractiveness of alternatives).
166
See Gray, supra note 154, at 30 (“[a]t the level of perception, the detection and interpretation of stimuli are
known to be deeply influenced by emotional state”); Finucane et al., supra note 145, at 341 (“mental representations
of the decision stimuli provoke on-line affective experiences that influence people’s perceptions and consequently
their judgments and decisions”).
167
See, e.g., Finucane et al., supra note 145, at 347 (“much research by social, clinical, and physiological
psychologists demonstrates that mood and emotion can direct attention toward or away from particular features in
the environment”).
168
See, e.g., Cosmides & Tooby, supra note 144, at 104; Finucane et al., supra note 145, at 341.
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vividly and frequently that other information is kept out of accessible memory.169 Thus, the
emotional salience of stimuli can substantially affect attention to, as well as perception and
memory of, both those stimuli and emotionally nonsalient stimuli.
Emotion also has a strong influence at the understanding stage. Different emotional
states are associated with distinct information-processing modes;170 for example, studies have
suggested that persons in whom a “sad mood” has been evoked process information more slowly
but possibly more accurately than “neutrals,” while those in a “happy mood” tend to process
information more quickly but with a lower level of accuracy.171 But from the perspective of
competence assessment, perhaps the most significant contribution of emotion to this stage of
decision-making is through “appraisal” and “appreciation.” Intimately tied to emotional
salience, appraisal and appreciation are interdependent aspects of understanding that concern
awareness of personal significance. Appraisal describes a “lighting-fast” judgment as to whether
and how particular stimuli matter to one’s well-being and goals,172 a judgment that will then
shape information processing.173 Intact appraisal leads to emotional reactions to personally

169

See Lazarus, supra note 118, at 17 (“When a person is in a traumatic situation, perception and thought may be
impaired, blocked, distracted, even paralyzed.”); Cosmides & Tooby, supra note 144, at 111 (describing
phenomenon among rape victims of experiencing prolonged period of time in which images of attack dominate).
170
Because this area of research is one of overlap between thinking and reasoning, it is discussed primarily under the
rubric of the latter.
171
See Daniel C. Molden & E. Tory Higgins, Motivated Thinking, in THE CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF THINKING
AND REASONING, supra note 93, at 295, 311; Svenson, supra note 145, at 297; DAMASIO, DESCARTES’ ERROR,
supra note 146, at 147, 163-64. But see note 152, infra (discussing contrary assertions by Isen & Labroo).
172
Clore, supra note 152, at 104 (“such evaluations are core features of the resulting emotions”); see also LAZARUS,
supra note 118, at 151-52 (“Very rapidly, perhaps even simultaneously, we draw on a variety of stored information
about the environment, person variables, and their relational meaning. How this is done remains something of a
mystery, but we must indeed automatically do something similar to what I have described, or else the emotion
process would not be adaptive and our emotional lives would be much more chaotic than they are.”).
173
LAZARUS, supra note 118, at 144, 145, 149-51 (“Although knowledge is the cold cognitive stuff of which
personal meaning is made, it is not an appraisal with its personal heat until the implications for personal well-being
have been drawn.” ); Fessler et al., supra note 152, at 117; Clore, supra note 152, at 104 (“[W]e arrive at the
emotional significance of events, actions, and objects through some sort of cognitive appraisal process.”).
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relevant stimuli.174 Such appraisal and the attending emotion then contribute heavily to the
specific understanding, or appreciation, that information presented to (and decisions required of)
a person are applicable to her and carry consequences for her personal situation.175 For example,
a defendant may understand that the death penalty is a potential consequence of her prosecution.
To say that she cannot appreciate that fact would mean that she literally does not think it applies
to her—for example, because she believes that she is immortal—or that she realizes that it
applies, but does not attach to that realization any emotional significance. Without appreciation
a defendant lacks Dusky “rational understanding.”176 This is largely because a person without
appreciation does not have access to the fear, hope, or other emotional reactions to relevant
information that normally would guide personally consequential decision-making.177
Reasoning also will be influenced by emotion states. For example, one exposed to a
negative feeling (e.g., fear evoked by recalling the sighting of a snake) generally will report an
increased (and likely inaccurate) estimation of the likelihood of future occurrence of events that,
though completely unrelated, may provoke the same negative feeling (e.g., a terrorist attack).178
That reasoning process likely would be quite different were the subject to have entered the
174

See Izard, supra note 124, at 206; Goldstein & Hogarth, supra note 107, at 9; LeDoux, supra note 153, at 291;
Gray, supra note 154, at 30 (“at the cognitive level, it is widely accepted that appraisal of a stimulus (e.g., as threat
or promise) plays a vital role in the initiation of the appropriate emotional state”).
175
Charland, supra note 85, at 362; Finucane et al., supra note 145, at 336; POYTHRESS ET AL., supra note 2, at 6364 “(Unlike understanding, which reflects comprehension at a more general and abstract level (i.e., how the legal
system is supposed to work), appreciation relates to a defendant’s beliefs about how legal actors and processes will
play out in his or her own case.”). But see Appelbaum, supra note 33 (“Since appreciation and appraisal rest on
similar cognitive abilities, it is probably not correct to say that one requires the other, so much as to say that
impairment of one function is likely to be accompanied by impairment of the other.”).
176
POYTHRESS ET AL., supra note 2, at 63-64. In the first iteration of failed appreciation, where the defendant
believes she is immortal, the competence defect is caused by delusional thinking, a manifestation of thought
disorder. See Part I.C., supra. It is to this form of appreciation, not the affective element, to which the MacArthur
researchers primarily direct their inquiry. See n. 293, infra.
177
See Charland, supra note 85, at 362-63, 370. In the thought-disorder iteration, the effect on emotion is
secondary: the delusional thought prevents access to the emotional reaction that would obtain were the cognitive
assessment accurate. In the second iteration, the effect is primary: the person lacks ability to generate the emotional
response at all, even given an accurate cognitive trigger.
178
See, e.g., Fessler et al., supra note 152, at 108 (discussing Johnson and Tversky’s “affective generalization
hypothesis”).

39

Emotional Competence, Rational Understanding, and the Criminal Defendant
probabilistic exercise with a different affective prior. However, the mechanisms by which
emotion influences reasoning remain contested. Research has suggested, for example, that
persons in a positive mood disproportionately draw inferences consistent with maintenance of
positive mood.179 Other researchers, however, argue that positive affect can be shown to make
reasoning “more efficient and more thorough, as long as the task is one that is meaningful,
interesting, or important to the decision maker.”180 To simplify a complex area, emotion’s
influence on reasoning is highly contextual.
Finally, emotion can profoundly influence choice, including its communication and
implementation. The person described above, inordinately fearful of terrorist attack, might make
specific choices (e.g., engaging in increased risk avoidance) on the basis of her affectively driven
reasoning. Emotion-driven choice can also be far more primal. Feeling- states predispose the
actor to particular behavioral responses—anger, for example, is highly associated with risktaking behavior and aggression, fear with risk avoidance and escape, and disgust with avoidance
and withdrawal.181 Some emotional experiences—notably fear—appear to be nearly automatic
responses to certain types of stimuli, with the result that they (and the outward behaviors with
which they are associated, such as freezing, running, or striking out) are experienced as
involuntary, or at least very difficult to override cognitively.182 It also has been suggested that
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See, e.g., Robyn A. LeBouef & Eldar B. Shafir, Decision Making, in THE CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF THINKING
supra note 93, at 243, 258; Finucane et al., supra note 145, at 333. But see Fessler et al., supra
note 152, at 108 (discussing contrary evidence).
180
Isen & Labroo, supra note 145, at 377, 383, 387 (“there is now growing evidence that positive affect promotes
both efficient and thorough problem solving and generally enhances cognitive ability and processes”; “positive
affect has a substantial facilitating impact on organization of thought, cognitive flexibility and elaboration,
evaluation of evidence, negotiation tactics and responsiveness, variety-seeking and risk-taking propensities, and the
efficiency and thoroughness of decision strategies”).
181
See, e.g., Fessler et al., supra note 152, at 109-110 (drawing on the work of, inter alia, Fridja and Lazarus); see
also Cosmides & Tooby, supra note 144, at 107 (“Specific acts and courses of action will be more available as
responses in some states than in others, and more likely to be implemented.”); Gray, supra note 154, at 30.
182
LE DOUX, supra note 1; see also Elizabeth A. Phelps et al., Intact performance on an indirect measure of race
bias following amygdala damage, 41 NEUROPSYCHOLOGIA 203, 203-04 (2003) (fear responses of the amygdala are
“automatic and not dependent on conscious, control processes”).
AND REASONING,
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extreme emotional instability causes inability to maintain a consistent choice preference.183
Ability to communicate a choice may also be impaired—for example, a person who firmly
wishes to obtain a divorce may feel unable to say so (and be thus frustrated in realizing his goal)
because of intense fear of public exposure to shame for having failed in his marriage.
As the above discussion reveals, a very significant movement within the mind sciences—
one that is increasingly reflected in legal theory184—asserts that, not only is emotion not the
natural enemy of rationality,185 it is intimately connected to the perception and processing of
information, appraisal of value, formation of goals, motivation of behavior, and implementation
of choice.186 Emotion can be a strong force contributing to rational thought by marking
particular stimuli as meaningful and generating a sense of personal relevance and value that will
shape goals and motivations. Thus, a lack of emotion where one normally would expect it to be
present can deprive the decision-maker of vital information and guidance. Emotion can also be
disruptive, in that it may derail optimal perception, understanding, reasoning, and
communication, or may override one’s otherwise preferred choices. While emotion and
cognition are deeply intertwined, the influence of the former cannot always be seen or accounted
for by reference only to the latter.

183

See LeBouef & Shafir, supra note 179, at 258; Svenson, supra note 145, at 316.
See Maroney, supra note 148, at __.
185
See Clore, supra note 152, at 102 (emotions are both operational tools that contribute to rationality and feedback
mechanisms that “tell us whether we have chosen rationally”); Slovic, supra note 122, at 990 (emotion and the
“affect heuristic” enable us “to be rational actors in many important situations. But not in all situations. It works
beautifully in some circumstances and fails miserably in others. The law must learn to tell the difference.”); Ryan,
supra note 157, at 249 (“[D]ecision-makers may be unduly swayed by inadequately considered emotional responses
as often as their decisions may fail to take proper account of emotionally-informed wisdom. But fear of the former
has driven the work of all emotionality underground in legal arenas, where it continues to influence deliberation
beyond recognition or redress.”); DAMASIO, DESCARTES’ ERROR, supra note 146, at 246.
186
See, e.g., Finucane et al., supra note 145, at 343 (an “affect heuristic” guides decisions, particularly “when the
required judgment is complex or mental resources are limited,” and may serve as “a necessary bridge across the
unexpected and the unknown. It facilitates information integration in judgments and decisions, guides reason, and
gives priorities among multiple goals,” in addition to “being a powerful motivator of behavior”).
184

41

Emotional Competence, Rational Understanding, and the Criminal Defendant
A complete account of the decisional competence component of Dusky rationality
therefore demands close attention to the positive and negative contributions of both cognition
and emotion.187 Because adjudicative competence is concerned with radical departures from
minimal norms of rational decision-making, we must think carefully about the sorts of emotional
dysfunction that might take a defendant so far outside these norms as to be declared unfit to
determine her own fate within a criminal proceeding. That is the project of the following
Section.
B. Emotional Disorder and Rational Decision-Making
We previously have explored the intimate relationship between cognition and emotion in
human decision-making, and in the preceding Part we saw how some courts have begun to
delineate how certain defects in cognitive processes might undermine adjudicative competence.
A similar effort is possible with regard to emotional dysfunction. However, no such effort has
been undertaken to date.
This is not to say that emotion is never discussed at all in connection with adjudicative
competence. Indeed, the caselaw occasionally surrenders small hints that emotion is considered
at least marginally relevant.188 Milton Dusky, for example, apparently experienced “emotional
turmoil,” as well as “depression, feelings of inadequacy and unworthiness,” and Richard Allen
Moran was described as depressed and wracked by remorse and guilt.189 The significance of
these emotional and mood states was never explained, but for they were some reason considered
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See Svenson, supra note 145, at 321 (consideration of affect “opens possibilities for a deeper understanding of
decision processes”).
188
In one reported case a court found a defendant incompetent to stand trial because “he did not emotionally
appreciate his peril sufficiently to assist his legal counsel in defense of the charge filed against him,” though the
higher court later overturned that ruling after finding that the defendant was in remission and his unusual emotional
expression and inappropriate affect could be explained to the jury. State v. Gwaltney, 468 P.2d 433, 433 (Wash.
1970) (defendant “was afflicted with the emotional disease of schizophrenia”).
189
Dusky, 271 F.2d at, 387-88, 391; Godinez, 509 U.S. at 410; see also Bonnie, supra note 18, at 587 (discussion of
Moran’s depression and remorse). See also Drope, 420 U.S. at 165 (James Drope was severely depressed).
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worthy of mention.190 Similarly, commentators and forensic theorists sometimes, in passing,
mention emotion-states as a potentially relevant consideration.191 One (now quite outdated and
likely seldom used) standardized forensic assessment instrument incorporated a direct measure
of a defendant’s “ability to deal emotionally with the criminal process.”192
However, while it seems that from time to time scholars, examiners, and courts regard
emotion as somehow relevant to adjudicative competence, there is no operative theory as to why
or how this is so.193 There certainly are few indications that emotion is thought to be relevant
because its intact functioning is critical to rational decision-making. Indeed, given the very long
history of rationality being explicitly opposed to emotion and the extremely recent genesis of
research and scholarship challenging that opposition,194 there is every reason to believe that
when courts, examiners,and commentators have spoken of rational understanding they have
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See also Strickland v. Francis, 738 F.2d 1542, 1549 & nn.12, 14 (11th Cir. 1984) (psychiatrist’s explanation of
how anxiety affects rational thought processes and relevance of emotional content of examinee’s speech);
Wilcoxson v. State, 22 S.W.3d 289, 307-08 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1999) (defendant “has been diseased emotionally and
socially all of his life, is “[e]motionally immature” and “emotional[ly] labile,” and has “elevated affect,” “affective
illness,” “depression,” “mood swings”) Moore v. United States, 464 F.2d 663, 665 (9th Cir. 1972) (defendant had
mood swings and “deep-seated emotional problems of long duration”); GRISSO, supra note 13, at 195.
191
See, e.g., Viljoen et al., supra note 168, at 24 (“Within Canadian law, a broad number of mental disorders can be
used as bases for finding a defendant unfit, such as psychotic, affective, cognitive, personality, and substance abuse
disorders.”); Bonnie, supra note 18, at 573 (“Problems in appreciating the situation and its consequences may arise
due to limitations in cognitive capacity, to disturbances of thought, or to affective disorders.”); Burt & Morris, supra
note 11, at 92 (society should “provide treatment opportunities to any defendant whose emotional stability and
consequent trial competency could be improved”); ROESCH & GOLDING, supra note 6, at 6-7 (“The issue of
competency raises a series of important theoretical and pragmatic questions regarding the nature of cognitive and
emotional capacities required by a defendant in order to be treated fairly.”); GRISSO, supra note 13, at 86
(“Psychological characteristics that may be relevant for developing … causal connections” between impaired
competence and etiology “include general intelligence, memory, contact with reality, motivation, reasoning or
problem solving, and emotional control.”).
192
GRISSO, supra note 13, at 132 (assessing the 1973 Competence Screening Test (CST)). As Grisso noted, there
was an “imperfect correspondence between the measurement constructs and legal criteria,” as the CST judged
“understanding of the consequences of the proceedings” with a measure of “ability to deal emotionally. … Thus the
legal construct is cognitive, whereas the measurement construct refers to an affective component.” Id. at 133.
However, Grisso mused that measures of affective and coping skills could relate to any of the Dusky components.
See id.
193
Cf. SANFORD H. KADISH & STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER, CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS PROCESSES: CASES AND
MATERIALS 912-14 (7th ed. 2001) (citing cases on psychopaths and “affective insanity,” including United States. v.
Currens, 290 F.2d 751, 761-63 (3d Cir. 1961)).
194
See Part II.B.2., supra.
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understood it to have nothing do to with emotion—or even to refer to the utter absence of
emotional influence.
The following Subsections propose two situations in which emotion ought properly to be
considered in determinations of adjudicative competence. The first is that of defendants with
psychiatric illnesses, particularly severe clinical depression, that can impair the accurate
perception and processing of decision-relevant information, derail formation of self-protective
motivation, and impair stable, self-interested choice. In these cases, we may be concerned about
a lack of emotional balance, as well as the damaging influence of a surfeit of particular
emotions, such as grief and despair, and a dearth of others, such as joy or hope. The second is
that of defendants with neurological defects, usually caused by brain damage, that impair
perception, processing, and expression of emotion in a manner that appears to disrupt rational
decision-making. Here, our concern stems from a general lack of emotion.195
1. Mood Disorder and Dusky-Relevant Emotional Dysfunction
A defendant’s competence may be threatened by mood disorder, a term encompassing a
range of mental illness but generally used to signify either “unipolar” or “bipolar” depression.196
Unipolar depression captures the cluster of symptoms most commonly associated with
depression: loss of interest in or pleasure from most activities; feelings of worthlessness, guilt,
and despair; change (usually a retardation) in motor activity; decreased energy; difficulty

195

This distinction between “organic” brain disease and psychiatric disease is firmly entrenched in the theory and
practice of both law and medicine, but it is anything but a hard distinction, and its validity is increasingly under
attack. See, e.g., DSM-IV-TR, supra note 100, at xxx; DAMASIO, DESCARTES’ ERROR, supra note 146, at 40 (“The
distinction between diseases of the ‘brain’ and ‘mind,’ between ‘neurological’ problems and ‘psychological’ or
‘psychiatric’ ones, is an unfortunate cultural inheritance that permeates society and medicine. It reflects a basic
ignorance of the relation between brain and mind. Diseases of the brain are seen as tragedies visited on people who
cannot be blamed for their condition, while diseases of the mind, especially those that affect conduct and emotion,
are seen as social inconveniences for which sufferers have much to answer.”).
196
DSM-IV-TR, supra note 100, at 345-36.
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thinking, concentrating, or making decisions; and, frequently, thoughts of suicide.197 Depression
also may incorporate manic episodes, periods associated with an unusually elevated mood (such
as euphoria), psychomotor agitation, inflated self-esteem and grandiosity, pressured speech, and
poor judgment.198 A person in whom major depressive episodes and manic episodes alternate
generally will be diagnosed as suffering from “bipolar” disorder, or what is referred to
colloquially as “manic depression.”199 Some manifestations of these disorders are relatively
short-lived or can have but minor effects on functioning.200 While such manifestations might
have some impact on rational decision-making—for example, were a defendant required to make
a very consequential choice while in the midst of a severe but short-term depressive or manic
episode—competence generally is liable to be seriously threatened only by more severe and
persistent manifestations, particularly where latitude is given for choices to be postponed until a
short-term episode has passed.201
The effects of severe clinical depression on, inter alia, attention, perception,
concentration, and memory are well-recognized in the clinical literature, and any one these
effects could derail one or more of the stages of competence-relevant decision-making.202 On
the perceptive level, the severely depressed may focus so disproportionately on mood-congruent
stimuli as to neglect important contrary information. For example, such persons may ponder or
197
See id. at 349-50 (definition of Major Depressive Episode); 369 (Major Depressive Disorder defined as history of
one or more Major Depressive Episodes without a history of Manic, Mixed, or Hypomanic Episodes).
198
See id. at 357-59 (definition of Manic Episode).
199
An extremely rapid and temporally compressed switching between depressive and manic symptoms may be
characterized as a “mixed episode.” Id. at 362-63 (definition of Mixed Episode); 382-83 (definition of Bipolar I
Disorder, characterized by one or more Manic Episodes or Mixed Episodes, frequently with one ore more Major
Depressive Episodes). See generally KAY REDFIELD JAMISON, AN UNQUIET MIND: A MEMOIR OF MOODS AND
MADNESS (1995) (personal history of professor of psychiatry’s struggle with manic-depressive illness).
200
See, e.g., id. at 376-77, 381-82 (Dysthymic Disorder or Depressive Disorder Not Otherwise Specified may not
entail serious functional deficits); id. at 365 (a Hypomanic Episode may be of brief duration).
201
See, e.g., id. at 349 (a Major Depressive Episode will have “clinically significant impairments in social,
occupational, or other important areas of functioning”).
202
See generally DSM-IV-TR, supra note 100, at 345-428; 2 KAPLAN & SADOCK’S COMPREHENSIVE TEXTBOOK OF
PSYCHIATRY 1338-77 (Benjamin J. Sadock & Virginia A. Sadock eds., 7th ed. 2000); SEVERE DEPRESSIVE
DISORDERS (Leon Grunhaus & John F. Greden eds., 1994).
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commit suicide out of “a desire to give up in the face of perceived insurmountable obstacles or
an intense wish to end an excruciatingly painful emotional state that is perceived by the person to
be without end,” though a non-depressed person might perceive other, more hopeful, facts and
possibilities.203 Depression-linked perceptive and understanding deficits may become so severe
as to incorporate delusions, hallucinations, and other symptoms characteristic of thought
disorder. For example, the depressed may develop feelings of “worthlessness or guilt … of
delusional proportions (e.g., a person who is convinced that he or she is personally responsible
for world poverty).”204 Moreover, depression appears to significantly derail normal appreciation,
preventing formation of self-interested motivation. A severely depressed person may be capable
of accurately grasping the factual parameters of her situation and options but report simply not
caring about what the correct course of action might be or how it might hinder or further her
personal well-being.205 Even if the depressed person does care about risk, the normal direction
of such caring may be reversed: she may want to take undue risks and may choose a clearly selfharming outcome.206
Nor are major depressive episodes the only culprits: the mania associated with bipolar
depression also can profoundly distort perception, reasoning, and choice. Manic persons
generally will be highly distractible and unable to distinguish between relevant and irrelevant
203

DSM-IV-TR, supra note 100, at 351.
Id. at xxx. See generally JAMISON, supra note 199 (describing psychotic aspects of author’s manic episodes).
205
See Godinez, 509 U.S. at 410-11, 417 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (Moran’s remorse and guilt might have made
him “inclined to exert less effort towards his own defense,” and he reported the he “really didn’t care about
anything” at the time of trial, leading him to a “self-destructive choice”). This connection has been discussed, albeit
in a quite limited fashion, within the literature on competence to consent to medical treatment and experimentation.
See Carl Elliot, Caring About Risks: Are Severely Depressed Patients Competent to Consent to Research?, 54
ARCH. GEN. PSYCHIATRY 113, 114 (1997). In a very preliminary exploration of the subject, a team of researchers
suggested that depressed and manic persons display distorted premises when making personally relevant decisions
under conditions of uncertainty. See Harold J. Bursztajn et al., Beyond Cognition: The Role of Disordered Affective
States in Impairing Competence to Consent to Treatment, 19 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 383, 383-85
(1991) (“the ext[a]nt models” for judging such competence “have tended to emphasize cognitive processes as the
sole elements of competence. The role of affect and of affective disorders in impairing competence has been
scanted.”).
206
See Elliot, supra note 214, at 115.
204
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stimuli and thoughts. Those experiencing mania often will exhibit disturbances of thought form,
such as extremely fast, pressured, tangential, and even nonsensical speech, as well as of thought
content, such as “[g]randiose delusions” as to their personal power and importance.207 On the
level of reasoning, the manic are prone to overestimate wildly their personal abilities and
chances of success in difficult situations. Further, persons experiencing mania are prone to
impulsive and imprudent choices, often in service of seeking immediate pleasure and
gratification.208 The extreme lability of affect associated with mania also can occasion frequent
and dramatic changes of course, obviating decision-making consistency.209
Despite these dramatic effects, the academic literature and caselaw generally do not
reflect any significant examination of the effects of depression, whether unipolar or bipolar, on
adjudicative competence.210 However, because mood-disordered defendants present with some
regularity, so too do these issues. Perhaps because of the lack of a strong theoretical exploration
of mood disorder in this context, the caselaw reflects a highly confused attitude as to its
relevance.

207

DSM-IV-TR, supra note 100, at 357. Bipolar depressives in whom thought disorder plays a prominent role may
be diagnosed as suffering from either a mood disorder with psychotic features or schizoaffective disorder. See id. at
319-23; see also JAMISON, supra note 199, at 181. For an empirical analysis of competence cases in which affective
disorder and psychoticism are presented together, see Viljoen et al., supra note 168, at 28, 33-34 (study found
“significant correlations between depression and impaired understanding and between withdrawal and impaired
reasoning on the MacCAT-CA for defendants with psychotic disorders”; another “found that conceptual
disorganization and delusional thinking had a stronger impact on legal abilities in defendants with affective
disorders than those with schizophrenia”); see also Hoge et al., supra note 81, at 337 & Table 1, 340-43 & Table 6.
208
See DSM-IV-TR, supra note 100, at 357-58; see also id. at 359 (“The person may be hostile and physically
threatening to others. Some individuals, especially those with psychotic features, may become physically assaultive
and suicidal. Adverse consequences of a Manic Episode (e.g., involuntary hospitalization, difficulties with the law,
or serious financial difficulties) often result from poor judgment and hyperactivity.”).
209
See id. at 357.
210
As previously noted, such issues sometimes are mentioned in passing. See, e.g., Bonnie, supra note 18, at 575 (a
decision may be non-delusional but nonetheless be “powerfully influenced by delusional beliefs or pathological
emotions … Organic deficits, retardation, psychotic thought disorder, delirium and dementia, extreme phobia or
panic, anxiety, euphoria and depression may impair a defendant’s capacity to weigh information in order to make
rational choices, consistent with starting premises and assigned values”); see also Welsh S. White, Defendants Who
Elect Execution, 48 U. PITT. L. REV. 853, 873-75(1987). It is also possible that, because certain specific
manifestations of depression can include psychosis, those particular manifestations might be captured by a Laffertylike test. However, the non-psychotic manifestations will not be.

47

Emotional Competence, Rational Understanding, and the Criminal Defendant
On the one hand, depression is sufficiently well-recognized (and its effects potentially so
devastating) that courts sometimes take note of it,211 and sometimes rely on it to support
incompetence findings. In Drope v. Missouri, for example, the Supreme Court found that while
a recent suicide attempt did not per se signal incompetence, it was highly relevant to whether a
competence inquiry was required, presumably because it provides some indication of serious
depression.212 More recent cases reflect a similar acknowledgment that depression is relevant,
though there is no particular consensus as to how or explanation of why.213 This was the case in
State v. Holland, in which the Supreme Court of Utah relied on the defendant’s bipolar mood
disorder to reverse a trial court’s finding of competence and remand for a hearing.214 Though the
court did not explain why manic depression signaled possible incompetence, it seemed irritated
with the trial court for relying heavily its assessment of Holland as “articulate,” suggesting that it
may have found the trial court’s test overly cognitive.215
On the other hand, courts also—and perhaps more frequently—dismiss the import of
depression in a manner that reflects a strong privileging of cognition.216 Indeed, the dissenting
judge in Holland focused on the defendant’s lack of evident thought disorder, apparently
211

See nn.195-97, infra (mentions of depression in Dusky, Drope, and Godinez); see also Wilcoxson v. State, 22
S.W.3d 289, 308 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1999).
212
See 420 U.S. 162, 179-80 (1975).
213
See, e.g., United States v. Mason, 935 F. Supp. 745 (W.D.N.C. 1996); Liles v. Saffle, 945 F.2d 333, 339 (10th Cir.
1991).
214
921 P.2d 430 (Utah 1996). An expert testified on an earlier remand that Holland “suffered from a mental illness
that is known as bipolar disorder with mixed features,” or “manic depressive illness,” and that he had been
incompetent “due to impulsivity, poor judgment, and the suicidality [sic] that he expressed at the time.” Id. at 434.
215
Id. at 435. Oddly, the court apparently considered Holland’s mood disorder relevant only to the “ability to
consult with counsel” prong of Dusky.
216
See, e.g., Myers v. Texas, No. 06-04-00033-CR, 2004 Tex. App. LEXIS, at *3-5 (Tex. App. Oct. 5, 2004)
(evidence that defendant had long history of bipolar disorder and hospitalization did not indicate a “severe mental
illness” requiring further inquiry, particularly in light of his factual understanding of case and “rational dialogue”
with counsel); United States v. Pappert, 45 F. Supp.2d 1231, 1235-36 (D. Kan. 1999) (history of hospitalization not
sufficient to overcome impression of defendant as “lucid and rational”); Moore v. Texas, 999 S.W.2d 385, 395 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1999); Collier v. State, 959 S.W.2d 621, 62 4 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997); Rivers v. Turner, 874 F.2d 771,
774 (11th Cir. 1989) (no inquiry by counsel warranted despite repeated and recent suicide attempts and psychiatric
treatment, as defendant could communicate with counsel, understand defense strategy, and respond appropriately to
questions).
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regarding affective disorder to be irrelevant.217 Depression’s negation of self-protective
motivation often has met with a similarly dismissive attitude. For example, in United States v.
Rivera, two court-appointed experts agreed that the defendant suffered from clinical depression
and was highly unmotivated to assist in his defense.218 The court nonetheless found him
competent, crediting testimony from one expert that Rivera had “the ability to effectively
communicate with his attorney and to assist in the planning of his defense but simply chooses not
to do so,”219 and rejecting contrary evidence that “depression prevents the defendant from being
motivated enough to communicate with his attorneys.”220 It then recounted apparently “rational”
behavior, such as speaking coherently, as further evidence of Rivera’s competence.221 The court
appeared to believe that depressed persons could be motivated to care about their fate if they
chose to be so motivated.222 In addition to being tautological, such reasoning signals a
fundamental disregard of the role of emotion-dependent appreciation and motivation within
rational decision-making.

217

921 P.2d at 438 (Howe, J., dissenting) (Holland—who denied depression and suicidal ideation—appeared to
understand the consequences of his decisions, and was not “out of touch” in the Lafferty sense but instead “was
always well rooted in reality”).
218
No. 90 CR 1001-1, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 349 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 12, 1995). Rivera initially had been deemed
incompetent and unlikely to be restored to competency in the foreseeable future; he was committed on the basis of
dangerousness. After a period of treatment he was again examined for competency; those evaluations were the
subject of the instant opinion. Both experts found that Rivera suffered from, inter alia, “a major affective disorder”
and was “depressed.” Id. at *8, 12.
219
Id. at *9, 14. One expert believed that Rivera, at least in part because of his depression, saw no point to
cooperating in his defense. See id. at *10 & n.2. However, he also believed that he was competent because his
depression was not “severe enough to impair his ability to participate in the proceedings or to understand the legal
consequences of the proceedings.” Id.
220
Id. at *13. The defense expert also believed that Rivera exhibited “a type of psychosis, manifesting itself in
magical or delusional thinking,” a finding the court rejected. However, the court also made clear that this expert’s
major reason for finding Rivera incompetent was not psychosis but rather the depression that prevented him from
caring enough to take self-protective action. See id. at *12-13.
221
Id. at *15. Cf. Commonwealth v. Goodreau, 813 N.E.2d 465 (Mass. 2004) (while taking seriously import of
defendant’s depression and self-harming goals, ultimately upholding competence finding).
222
See also United States v. Landsman, 366 F. Supp. 1027, 1029 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (depressed defendant competent
despite “expressed lack of will to assist his defense” because he had the “ability” to so choose); cf. North Carolina v.
Avery, 337 S.E.2d 786, 790 (N.C. 1985) (citing expert testimony that the removed portion of defendant’s frontal
lobes controlled “affect and mood but has no significant effect on memory,” such that the defendant appeared to
“have chosen not to remember the events of the allegations”).
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The tension between these attitudes as to the impact of depression is perhaps most clearly
seen in the very thorny context of execution volunteer cases. Because competent defendants are
free to decide whether to challenge a lawfully imposed punishment, death-row inmates generally
will be presumed able to acquiesce to execution;223 but because such acquiescence may spring
from suicidal depression, purported best friends often come forward to try and prevent what they
consider a suicide by execution.224
It appears that, in this battle, confusion reigns supreme225 but that a disproportionate
focus on cognitive abilities is winning. This certainly was the case in Rumbaugh v. Procunier.226
Two forensic examiners agreed that Rumbaugh was “profoundly depressed” and that such
depression substantially affected “his capacity in the premises” on which his decisions were
reached, and might “act as a coercive force and impair[] his ability to exercise free will to make a

223

These cases are governed by the “rational choice” rule of Rees v. Peyton, 384 U.S. 312, 314 (1966), which postGodinez likely has the same meaning as Dusky rational understanding. See I.A., supra.
224
See, e.g., White, supra note 210, at 873-75; State v. Passaro, 567 S.E.2d 862, 865 n.9 (S.C. 2002); State v.
Sagastegui, 954 P.2d 1311, 1322 (Wash. 1998); Smith v. Armontrout, 865 F.2d 1502 (8th Cir. 1988). To be sure, so
long as the United States has a system of capital punishment, there must be some circumstances under which a
death-row inmate competently may choose to forgo the fight for her life. In some situations a person may have not
just logical but sound reasons for wanting to end life, see Washington v. Gluckberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997); Vacco v.
Quill, 521 U.S. 793 (1997), and respect for individual autonomy dictates that inmates enjoy the same right as others
to make such a choice. But clearly the situation is altered where the death is to come not from disease or a reasoned
decision to abandon treatment but instead by state-ordered execution; and in any right-to-die context the possible
impact of affective disorder should be robustly considered. See OR. REV. STAT. §§127.825 (2003) (“No medication
to end a patient's life in a humane and dignified manner shall be prescribed until the person performing the
counseling determines that the patient is not suffering from a psychiatric or psychological disorder or depression
causing impaired judgment.”). For an excellent exploration of the issues raised by execution volunteers and a
proposed test for distinguishing between inmates whose choice not to fight execution is permissible and those for
whom the choice should be disallowed as suicidally motivated, see John H. Blume, Killing the Willing: Volunteers,
Suicide, and Competency, 103 MICH. L. REV. 939 (2005).
225
Consider the long and hotly contested battle over whether Michael Ross was competent to abandon challenges to
his 2005 execution by the State of Connecticut. Ross for years attempted to be put to death—indeed, after his
original death sentence was overturned, he had sought unsuccessfully to stipulate to the death penalty, which was
then reimposed after a new hearing—but a series of purported next friends argued that his desire to die was caused
by the depression associated with “death row syndrome.” A District Court first credited expert testimony that Ross’
decision was “driven by suicidal despair, rather than an exercise of free will.” Ross v. Lantz, No. 05-CV-116 (RC)
at 6 (D.Conn. Jan. 25, 2004). However, Ross eventually was found competent and executed. See 2005 Conn.
Super. LEXIS 1116; Ross ex rel. Dunham v. Lantz, 408 F.3d 121 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 2006 (2005).
226
753 F.2d 395 (5th Cir. 1985), cert. denied sub nom. Rumbaugh v. McCotter, 473 U.S. 919 (1985).
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decision.” 227 They nonetheless concluded that he was competent to exercise rational choice
because he understood his position and was able to “think coherently” and reason “logically.”228
The Fifth Circuit, though recognizing the challenge of determining what “rational” might mean
in such circumstances, noted that Rumbaugh had filed “an extremely coherent and well-reasoned
pro se state habeas corpus petition” and upheld the finding of competence because Rumbaugh’s
decision to end his life was “logical,” igven the intense suffering caused by his depression.

229

As with the majority opinion in Rivera, the Rumbaugh majority’s approach fails to give
adequate consideration to the disabling effects of depression. As the dissenting judge in
Rumbuagh correctly argued, the majority opinion rested on a limited and largely cognitiondriven standard of rationality, erroneously equating “’rational’ with logical.” 230 On the
majority’s view, “a person’s cognition, his understanding, is deemed tantamount to an ability to
choose rationally.”231 Such a result displays a lack of respect for the vital contributions of
emotion, particularly through the mechanisms of appraisal and appreciation, to rational decisionmaking.
227

Id. at 400.
Id. at 399-400. At the hearing, Rumbaugh (apparently to make clear that he had affirmatively chosen to die)
lunged at a court officer with a hand-made weapon and commanded the officer to shoot him; he was indeed shot,
though he did not die. See id. at 397; see also Rumbaugh v. Estelle, 558 F. Supp. 651, 653-54 (N.D. Tex. 1983).
While he was being taken to a hospital, one expert testified that the incident supported his conclusion that
Rumbaugh’s decision to die was rational. See 753 F.2d at 397.
229
Id. at 402 (“Rumbaugh is able to feed relevant facts into a rational decision-making process and come to a
reasoned decision … one of the facts is that Rumbaugh is mentally ill, he has severe depression, with no hope of
successful treatment which would reduce his current mental discomfort to a tolerable level …. [His] assessment
of his legal and medical situations, and the options available to him, are reasonable[, though] if the medical
situation vis-à-vis treatment were different, Rumbaugh might reach a different decision about continuing judicial
proceedings. In other words, Rumbaugh’s disease influences his decision because it is the source of mental pain
which contributes to his invitation of death.”); id. at 403 (refusing to conclude “as a matter of law that a person
who finds his life situation intolerable and who welcomes an end to the life experience is necessarily legally
incompetent to forgo further legal proceedings which might extend that experience”).
230
Id. at 404 (Goldberg, J., dissenting); see also 558 F. Supp. at 653 (expert testified that Rumbaugh’s decision was
“rational or at least logical”). Judge Goldberg’s arguments were echoed by Justices Marshall and Brennan in a
dissent from the denial of certiorari. See Rumbaugh v. McCotter, 473 U.S. 919, 919 (1985) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting). Though Judge Goldberg argued that Rees “rational choice” competence was quite different from Dusky
“rational understanding” competence and that Rumbaugh would have been Dusky-competent, see 753 F.2d at 41112, the case was decided before Godinez, and such comments no longer have persuasive force.
231
Rumbaugh, 753 F.2d at 409.
228
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A similarly dismissive attitude often attends the impact of depression on choice.
Consider Smith v. Armontrout, in which the Eighth Circuit deemed competent a severely
depressed defendant who had over the course of his imprisonment changed his mind as to
whether to pursue or abandon appeals at least ten times.232 The dissenters urged careful attention
to the destabilizing effects of depression with its “frequent mood changes”233 and “unstable and
self-destructive tendencies.”234 But though such lability is a common aspect of depression,
particularly the bipolar sort, the majority without significant elaboration deemed Smith capable
of choosing to “suffer the consequences of” his crime and declined to order a new evaluation.235
Armontrout does not appear to be an outlier case. While inability to maintain a consistent choice
preference may be seen by courts as irritating or threatening to finality, it seldom is considered as
an indicator of possible adjudicative incompetence.
Thus, the cases reveal a very real and persistent disagreement over the appropriate level
of consideration to be given to affective disorder, particularly clinical depression, when
determining adjudicative competence. Even those examiners and courts that think depression
relevant appear to lack an articulated theory as to why. And, unfortunately, the general
resolution of that debate reflects simplistic notions of decision-making, consisting of nothing
more than intact cognition plus the powers of deductive reasoning.

232

865 F.2d 1502, 1503-06 (8th Cir. 1988) (en banc); see also id. at 1512 (Lay, C.J., dissenting).
Id. at 1513 (Heaney, J., dissenting).
234
Id. at 1511 (Lay, C.J., dissenting). The dissenters quoted the following testimony of forensic examiners: “Now,
the problem there for me is on the rational side. In the past some courts have interpreted that as an affective
component that’s a lot more subjective. … [I]t’s a fuzzy area. I’m not sure that person who is facing death, who is
condemned to die, who experiences hopelessness anyway, who does have some lack in social skills, in terms of
coping skills, I’m not sure that that allows a person to be ‘fully rational.’ I don’t know what the standard is or what
the ideal is there.” Id. at 1509. “He’s cognitively aware. I don’t know how emotionally aware he is.” Id. at 1510.
235
Id. at 1507.
233
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2. Brain Damage and Dusky-Relevant Emotional Dysfunction
Another manifestation of emotional dysfunction relevant to competent decision-making
is that attending certain forms of brain damage, particularly to regions of the frontal lobes. The
emotional deficits associated with such brain damage appear to be highly correlated with
persistent inability to make self- protective choices in situations of risk to one’s own thriving,
despite retention of cognitive capacity. Though such disorderalmost certainly is less common
than clinical depression, these cases now are beginning to surface and their proper resolution
promises to be hotly contested.
Evidence of concurrent emotion-and-reasoning deficits attending brain damage is found
in the cognitive neuroscience literature—particularly (but by no means exclusively) the work of
Antonio Damasio236—and is grounded in the story of the most famous neurological patient in
history, Phineas Gage.237 In 1848 Gage survived a railroad-construction accident in which an
iron rod was propelled at high speed through his head. Amazingly, he remained conscious and
appeared to recover with nothing more than disinfectant and bandages. His miraculous recovery,
however, was elusive. It was only a matter of time before all who knew him concluded that
“Gage was no longer Gage.”238 Whereas before he had been polite, prudent, and hard-working,
he became impatient, foul-mouthed, and prone to fits of rage. Though still intelligent and
skilled, Gage became unable to keep a job; in fact, as his doctor recalled, “he was good at

236

Other important work on the role of emotion in decision-making has been pursued by, inter alia, Edmund Rolls.
See, e.g., EDMUND T. ROLLS, THE BRAIN AND EMOTION (1999).
237
An account of the Gage case may be found in DAMASIO, DESCARTES’ ERROR, supra note 146, at 3-33; see also
MICHAEL S. GAZZANIGA ET AL., COGNITIVE NEUROSCIENCE: THE BIOLOGY OF THE MIND 537-39 (2d ed. 2002);
Michael S. Gazzaniga & Megan S. Steven, Free Will in the Twenty-First Century: A Discussion of Neuroscience
and the Law, in NEUROSCIENCE AND THE LAW: BRAIN, MIND AND THE SCALES OF JUSTICE 51, 59-62 (Brent Garland
ed., 2004).
238
GAZZANIGA ET AL., COGNITIVE NEUROSCIENCE, supra note 237, at 539.
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‘always finding something which did not suit him,’” and appeared to have become incapable of
planning or forethought.239 He became transient and died penniless 13 years later.240
The Gagecase led to a number of fundamental insights ani mating the modern
neurosciences, including that “lesions of circumscribed areas of the brain could cause the loss
of very specific mental or nervous functions in humans.”241 Further, that the “new Gage”
lacked emotional regulation and became unable to plan for (or execute action toward) a stable
future suggested that such abilities might be both intertwined and dependent on the brain areas
damaged in the accident.242 Though many brain areas now have been shown to be involved
with emotional perception, processing, regulation, and expression,243 damage to the
ventromedial portions of prefrontal cortex—the areas damaged in Gage244—has been shown to
interfere with “social and emotional competence while not affecting cognitive competence in
239

DAMASIO, DESCARTES’ ERROR, supra note 146, at 9, 11 (quoting Dr. John Harlow, who memorialized his
interactions with Gage in John M. Harlow, Recovery from the passage of an iron bar through the head, 2 PUB.
MASS. MED. SOC. 327 (1848), and John M. Harlow, Passage of an iron rod through the head, 39 BOSTON MED. &
SURGICAL J. 389 (1848-49)).
240
See DAMASIO, DESCARTES’ ERROR, supra note 146, at 7-10.
241
John T. Cacioppo & Gary G. Berntson, Social Neuroscience, in THE COGNITIVE NEUROSCIENCES III, supra note
155, at 977. Of course, few patients suffer brain injury because of metal rods like Gage’s tamping iron; bullets to
the head are far more common in modern life. See, e.g., State v. Avery, 337 S.E.2d 786 (N.C. 1997) (defendant shot
himself through head and portions of frontal lobes removed); State v. Shytle, 374 S.E.2d 573 (N.C. 1989) (selfinflicted gunshot wound to head impaired defendant’s emotional responses). Other causes also abound. “Damage
to the frontal lobes can be caused by a myriad of insults, including direct trauma, vascular lesions, infectious,
degenerative and metabolic processes.” Reid-Proctor et al., supra note 99, at 381; see also Pate, 383 U.S. at 381
(defendant hit on head by brick as child and later shot himself in the head).
242
GAZZANIGA ET AL., COGNITIVE NEUROSCIENCE, supra note 237, at 533-39 (cases like that of Gage demonstrate
that we “need to understand how emotion and motivation influence our ability to process information and choose
actions. … Although he showed no obvious impairment in his intelligence and perceptual or motor abilities, he was
no longer able to evaluate appropriately the significance of events and regulate his emotional responses.”).
243
The brain areas most obviously implicated in emotion are the amygdala, hippocampus, orbitofrontal cortex, and
ventromedial cortex. See GAZZANIGA ET AL., COGNITIVE NEUROSCIENCE, supra note 237, at 537-76; Todd F.
Heatherton et al., Introduction: Emotion and Social Neuroscience, in THE COGNITIVE NEUROSCIENCES III, supra
note 155, at 973, 974. For definitions and descriptions of these and other brain areas, see GAZZANIGA ET AL.,
COGNITIVE NEUROSCIENCE, supra note 237, at 62-95. The effect of brain damage to emotion-relevant brain areas on
competence, and on decision-making generally, is a promising site of future research, both scientific and legal.
244
GAZZANIGA ET AL., COGNITIVE NEUROSCIENCE, supra note 237, at 538. This research was made possible by the
remarkable fact that Gage was buried with his tamping rod, and Dr. Harlow had his body exhumed and retained both
the rod and Gage’s skull. These were examined nearly a century later by Hanna Damasio and colleagues, who used
computer simulation techniques to recreate the trajectory of the rod through Gage’s brain. See Hanna Damasio et
al., The return of Phineas Gage: The skull of a famous patient yields clues about the brain, 264 SCIENCE 1102
(1994).
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other domains.”245 It therefore is to these areas—and to prefrontal cortex246 more generally—
that researchers have looked for an intersection between emotion and decision-making.
In Descartes’ Error Damasio describes clinical evidence of what he dubbed a “Gage
matrix” of disabilities attending frontal lobe damage. His most detailed description is of a
patient known as “Elliot,” whom Damasio styled as a “modern-day Phineas Gage.” Following
surgery for a brain tumor in which portions of his frontal lobes were removed, Elliot went on a
downward spiral—losing jobs, squandering money on suspect investment schemes, and
alienating family members—that eventually resulted in inability to support himself.247
Examinations revealed that Elliot was intelligent, had intact cognitive abilities, and displayed
normal knowledge of ethics, social conventions, and moral value. On two measures of
functioning, though, he was highly abnormal. First, Elliot was emotionally flat. He was able to
recognize and describe the emotional salience of stimuli, such as pictures of gruesome injuries,
but displayed no normal physiological reactions to such stimuli.248 Second, he displayed a
profound dissociation between “real-life failure and laboratory normalcy” in making choices.249
In laboratory conditions, he was able to solve hypothetical problems as well or better than most,
but in his personal life he continuously made disastrous choices in the face of clear warning
signals, resulting in the loss of virtually all his assets and social supports.250 Damasio reports
having examined twelve other patients with similar brain damage: each displayed the same

245

Heatherton et al., supra note 254, at 974.
Prefrontal cortex is the most evolutionarily “new” portion of the human brain and is thought to be critical to
“higher” brain functions, including reasoning and executive control. See GAZZANIGA ET AL., COGNITIVE
NEUROSCIENCE, supra note 237, at 75.
247
See DAMASIO, DESCARTES’ ERROR, supra note 146, at 34-37. Though this issue is not discussed by Damasio in
detail, it signals another area of the law to which such emotional dysfunction could be relevant: that of entitlement to
disability benefits. Because of Elliot’s cognitive intactness, he initially was denied benefits; after Damasio’s
investigation, he was granted benefits.
248
Id. at 45 (characterizing this emotionally flat state as “to know but not to feel”) (emphasis in original).
249
Id. at 45-46.
250
Id. at 41-50.
246
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“combination of decision-making defect and flat emotion and feeling,” leading him to conclude
that “the powers of reason and the experience of emotion decline together,” and that “their
impairment stands out in a neuropsychological profile within which basic attention, memory,
intelligence and language appear so intact that they could never be invoked to explain the
patients’ failures in judgment.”251
The clinical evidence of this precise correlation between emotional dysfunction and
impaired personal decision-making is limited—at least in part because brain damage is often
diffuse, meaning that persons with damage to ventromedial prefrontal cortex often will have
damage elsewhere, such that “Gage matrix” symptoms may present as part of a larger and more
varied set of disorders.252 Moreover, Damasio’s account of why emotion and reasoning are so
intertwined is contested within cognitive neuroscience.253 His theory, rooted in what he calls the
“somatic marker hypothesis,” appears directed primarily to appraisal, appreciation, and choice:
lack of emotion, he has proposed, might prevent these persons “from assigning different values
to different options,” making their “decision-making landscape hopelessly flat” or, perhaps, “too
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Id. at 53-56, 139 (those with prefrontal damage “cannot generate emotions relative to the images conjured up by
certain categories of situation and stimuli, and thus cannot have the ensuing feeling,” but can experience primary
emotions (such as instinctive fear) and thus may appear to have intact affect in some situations). This clarification is
important, as it can explain Gage’s “fits of rage” and account for the fact that even persons like Elliot are capable of
sometimes experiencing and expressing some emotion. It would be very strange for literally all emotional capacity
to be eliminated, as there is no single “emotion center” in the brain.
According to Damasio, individual expression of “Gage matrix” impairment will vary—for example,
according to the stage of life at which the individual’s brain damage occurred. However, he believes these persons
to share a common core of impairments, including being “[r]igid and perseverant in their approach to life” and
unable to organize their lives and futures; displaying stereotyped mannerisms; and having diminished experience of
pleasure and pain. Such patients will also display normal intelligence and a lack of motor, sensory, or
communication defects. Id. at 58.
252
For example, persons with damage to various regions of the frontal lobes may have broad impairments to what is
called “executive function” or “executive control.” Executive function refers to a cluster of high-level brain
functions “which orchestrate relatively simple ideas, movements, or actions into complex goal-directed behavior.”
Laurence B. McCullough et al., Implications of Impaired Executive Control Functions for Patient Autonomy and
Surrogate Decision Making, 12 J. CLINICAL ETHICS 392 (2001) (impairment to executive control caused by, inter
alia, depression, brain trauma or psychosis can cause “apathy and impairment of goal directed thinking; reduced
emotional control resulting in marked personality changes … and diminished ability to engage in abstract
thinking”); see also Reid-Proctor et al., supra note 99. at 377.
253
See, e.g., Beer, et al., supra note 127, at 1095-98 (presenting competing theories).
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shifty and unsustained” to support sound and consistent choices.254 Whether this account is
correct remains to be rigorously tested. But regardless of debates as to the nature of underlying
mechanisms, it is now accepted that brain damage affecting emotional perception, processing,
and expression—particularly damage to the frontal cortices—is correlated with diminished
rationality, particularly in the realm of highly personal decision-making.255
This research has at least three important implications for assessments of adjudicative
competence. First, persons with specific forms of frontal lobe damage might with some
regularity become defendants, as their extreme decision-making deficits may lead to poor
choices (and, in rare cases, disinhibited and aggressive behaviors) with criminal consequences.256
If this is so, it is particularly important that adjudicative competence doctrine have a theory as to
how such persons should be regarded. Second, such persons may exhibit intact cognitive
abilities and yet be incapable of the kind of high-stakes, highly personal decision-making
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DAMASIO, DESCARTES’ ERROR, supra note 146, at 52-53. Damasio also theorized that Elliot’s decision-making
“defect appeared to set in at the late stages of reasoning, close to or at the point at which choice making or response
selection must occur.” Id. at 50-51.
255
See, e.g., GAZZANIGA ET AL., COGNITIVE NEUROSCIENCE, supra note 237, at 547 (“The orbitofrontal cortex
seems to be especially important for processing, evaluating, and filtering social and emotional information. The
result is that damage to this region impairs the ability to make decisions that require feedback from social or
emotional cues.”); see also id. at 553 (“the orbitofrontal cortex must rely on learned information about the emotional
qualities of stimuli in order to assess the utility of our actions”); Laurence R. Tancredi, Neuroscience Developments
and the Law, in NEUROSCIENCE AND THE LAW, supra note 237, at 71, 87-88. Damasio asserts that while it “is true
that “uncontrolled or misdirected emotion can be a major source of irrational behavior,” “[r]eduction in emotion
may constitute an equally important source of irrational behavior.” DAMASIO, DESCARTES’ ERROR, supra note 146,
at 52-53
Damasio’s theory of a “Gage matrix” also is supported by research on deficits among anosognosiacs,
persons with right-hemisphere cortical damage who suffer obvious left-side motor defects (such as paralysis) but
who fail consciously to recognize their affliction. “Anosognistics have flattened emotion and feeling. They are
similar to frontal-damage patients in terms of highly impaired decision-making – but unlike frontal patients they are
obviously disabled, and thus are likely shielded from many opportunities to make bad decisions. Because “patients
with prefrontal lesions appear neurologically normal,” they “can engage in a variety of social interactions that will
easily expose their defective reasoning.” Id. at 67.
256
See, e.g., Reid-Proctor et al., supra note 99, at 381 (“Involvement with the legal system may especially be likely
if pre-morbid antisocial, histrionic or narcissistic personality features are intensified following frontal lobe injury.”);
see also GAZZANIGA ET AL., COGNITIVE NEUROSCIENCE, supra note 237, at 550 (while these patients generally are
“more hurtful to themselves than others,” some with orbitofrontal damage might also exhibit “antisocial behavior
disorders and difficulties controlling violent or aggressive impulses”). But see Gazzaniga & Steven, supra note 248,
at 62. The possibility of post-brain-damage involvement in crime is strongly supported by the case of “Jane,”
discussed infra.
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required of criminal defendants, and that inability will present together with—and perhaps be
caused by—severe impairment in ability to experience and express emotion. In these cases,
failure to consider impaired emotional capacity might lead to an erroneous finding of
competence, either because deadened emotion is not recognized as a clue leading to further
inquiry that might uncover brain damage,257 or because of imposition of an overly cognitive test
in which the emotion and decision-making deficits, even if proven, are dismissed as irrelevant.258
Third, other brain-damaged persons (for example, those with more diffuse sites of injury) may
display the above-described impairments as well as cognitive and motor deficits. In these cases,
the danger of false negative might be lower; but as competence determinations look to the
combined effects of impairments, failure to take seriously those going to emotion and personal
decision-making could remove important information from the calculus.
These issues are novel, and to date are scarcely reflected in the caselaw. However, to the
limited extent that they have been addressed they have met with inconsistent results.
Consider the case of “Jane,” a prominent member of society with a long and impressive
record of educational and professional accomplishments and philanthropic activities. 259
Unbeknownst to her, she suffered from a congenital blood-flow defect known as an
arteriovenous malformation (“AVM”), located in the left frontal lobe of her brain. Very late in
her life Jane began suddenly to engage in a series of obviously foolish financial schemes, and
experienced a downfall much like that of Damasio’s Elliot. She lost virtually all of her family’s
money, was sued for financial improprieties, and eventually was convicted for minor
257

Such was the case with “Jane,” a defendant whose case is discussed infra.
Cf. Reid-Proctor et al., supra note 99, at 382 (“commonly used screening tests which focus on memory or
orientation may be relatively insensitive to deficits in executive functioning, making it easier for an examiner to be
misled regarding competency in patients suffering frontal lobe injury”).
259
“Jane” is based on a former client of the author. Out of respect for that defendant’s privacy and that of her
family, the author has chosen not to identify her or discuss her case in detail in this Article. All descriptions of Jane
and her situation are based on factual statements made in publicly filed documents in her case.
258
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participation in what was revealed to be a fraudulent investment scheme. The brain damage was
discovered in the sentencing phase, after new defense counsel—seeking to determine the cause
of her sharp change in life circumstances and struck by her odd emotionalprofile —arranged for
psychiatric and developmental testing and, finally, a neurological exam and brain scan. The scan
both showed the AVM and revealed that at some point, likely quite late in Jane’s life and
probably shortly before the start of her “downfall,” the AVM had ruptured and bled. Extensive
neuropsychological testing then revealed that Jane retained her extremely high intelligence and
virtually all of her cognitive abilities, though she did display the highly tangential and
perseverative speech characteristic of a thought disorder.260 This general cognitive intactness
had largely masked others’ ability to recognize her progressively more serious deficits.
However, her affect was noticeably constricted and she was consistently unable to make selfprotective choices in personal, particularly financial, matters. Significantly, she appeared utterly
incapable of perceiving the mental instability of the fraud’s ringleader and the implausibility of
her representations and promises, though those facts were immediately evident to others. She
also appeared strangely detached from the extremely serious repercussions of her conviction for
both her and her family. A court-appointed expert, after considering the defense’s evidence and
examining Jane, opined that she was adjudicatively incompetent.261
Jane’s case would appear to be the first in which an examiner has explicitly relied on
evidence of a “Gage matrix” disorder to make a finding of adjudicative incompetence. Other

260

Jane’s speech disorders also appeared linked to brain damage, in that scarring from the AVM rupture extended
into areas connected with production of language. While others had noticed her increasingly bizarre speech, it
appears to have been written off because she was getting older and perhaps more “quirky.” She was also a speaker
of English as a foreign language, a factor that may have impeded some persons’ ability to discern that her speech
had become disordered.
261
The evidence of Jane’s previously undiscovered brain damage also raised significant issues as to her legal
responsibility for the conduct of conviction. For a variety of reasons not relevant to this discussion, that issue has
not been and likely never will be litigated.
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instances in which similar issues were raised have met with very different outcomes, as decisionmakers in those cases regarded evidence of emotional dysfunction to be irrelevant.
The first such case is North Carolina v. Shytle. Wanda Graybeal Shytle shot herself in
the head after killing a number of family members. Expert examinations conducted after her
self-inflicted injury indicated that while her intelligence and memory were intact, the significant
damage to Shytle’s brain “impaired her emotional reactions to situations” and led to
inappropriate behavior, such as laughing at serious moments, that suggested that she failed to
grasp the seriousness of her plight. One examiner testified that she was incompetent because
“her affective appreciation of events has been lost,” preventing her from “understanding her legal
situation and cooperating with her attorney.”262 The North Carolina Supreme Court was asked
whether, “if an individual’s cognitive, reasoning ability is separated from basic emotional
responses or affect,” she would be competent to aid in her defense and proceed to trial.”263
Two trial judges, without significant discussion, determined that she was competent, and
the North Carolina Supreme Court agreed:
There was evidence that the defendant had an IQ within the normal range and that
she knew what the charges were and what could happen to her if she was
convicted. If this did not worry or upset her because of her altered medical
condition, it does not mean that she did not understand those facts. … If the
defendant’s situation did not bother her it does not mean she did not comprehend
it.264
This analysis—in which the extreme abnormality of Shytle’s lack of emotional reaction to her
potentially dire situation was sanitized by the presence of bare intellectual understanding—

262

374 S.E.2d at 575.
374 S.E.2d 573, 573, 575 (N.C. 1989).
264
Id. at 575-76. Recall that apparently being “unbothered” by the very serious ramifications of her criminal case
was also a symptom exhibited by Jane, and was one of the attributes that most troubled defense counsel and led to
further investigation of her impairment.
263
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ignores the importance of appreciation in shaping self-protective motivations and goals.265 In
Shytle, then, cognitive function simply trumped emotional dysfunction, without a considered
effort to determine how the latter might have affected rationality.
Similar evidence met with a similar disposition in the recent clemency petition of Donald
Beardslee, executed in 2005 for taking part in a multiple murder to avenge a small debt.266
Though the issue argued there was not competency but, rather, potential mitigation providing a
reason to spare his life, the way in which the brain-damage arguments were treated is relevant
and illuminating.267 In an eleventh-hour bid for clemency, Beardslee’s attorneys came forward
with new evidence suggesting that he had brain damage—present at birth and aggravated by two
head injuries in adulthood, one of which resulted in coma—that, among other deficits, impaired
emotional capacity.268 According to a defense expert and family members, throughout his life
Beardslee appeared unable appropriately to express emotion, was unusually gullible and naïve,

265

Id. at 575. Even if the behavioral expression of Shytle’s apparent affective disorder was not considered relevant
to competence, it likely should have been considered relevant to whether her appearance to a jury would deprive her
of a fair trial. See, e.g., Riggins, 504 U.S. at 138; see also id. at 142-44 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (drugs may
unfairly alter defendant’s “emotional responses”); Sell, 539 U.S. at 166, 179 (same); see also note 267, infra (raising
similar issues with regard to Donald Beardslee and “Jane”).
266
See, e.g., Bob Egelko et al., Donald Beardslee executed; Killer put to death at San Quentin, S.F. CHRON., A-1
(Jan. 19, 2005).
267
Not only was Beardslee’s brain injury relevant to his conduct, in that it might suggest that he responded to the
chaotic and stressful circumstances of the crime with confusion and panic, leading him to imitate the actions of his
co-defendants, but it might also explain imposition of the death penalty, as his “constricted emotional range was
likely to be viewed” by the jury “as indicating aloofness, indifference or even callousness.” Declaration of Rubin C.
Gur, Ph.D., Ex. 51 in Support of Petition for Executive Clemency, Donald J. Beardslee (dated Dec. 30, 2004)
(hereinafter “Gur Declaration”), at 5-6 ¶¶11-12. Similarly, Jane’s relatively flat affect could make her appear
“cold,” and the prosecutor repeatedly expressed frustration with what he considered her lack of remorse. Further, it
was reported to the author that several schoolchildren who observed part of her trial on a field trip were scared by
Jane’s vacant demeanor and regarded her as “spooky.” These concerns echo those expressed in Riggins, 504 U.S. at
142-44, and Sell, 539 U.S. at 181, 185, with regard to the potential for psychotropic medication to alter a defendant’s
emotional expression. But see State v. Gwaltney, 468 P.2d 433, 434-35 (Wash. 1970) (holding that defendant’s
uncontrollably inappropriate emotional expression could be adequately explained to jury).
268
See generally Petition for Executive Clemency, Donald J. Beardslee (dated Dec. 30, 2004). According to that
petition and the supporting materials, Beardslee showed early signs of brain damage and throughout his life
exhibited both abnormal emotional perception and expression and poor judgment. As a young man he suffered head
injuries a car accident, and several years later was hospitalized with skull fracture and frontal lobe injury after being
hit by a falling tree.

61

Emotional Competence, Rational Understanding, and the Criminal Defendant
and exhibited terrible judgment when making personal decisions under conditions of stress and
uncertainty.269
In a response closely paralleling that in the Shytle case, prosecutors offered a purely
cognitive theory: Beardslee could not be seriously brain-damaged, at least not in a legally
meaningful way, because he had a relatively high IQ, well-developed cognitive skills, got good
grades, had before his incarceration been capable of caring for himself, and had a solid work
history.270 To the extent that Beardslee failed to show emotion, the state argued, that merely
showed his lack of remorse. The Governor of California, Arnold Schwarzenegger, agreed.
While acknowledging thatthe claim that brain injury left Beards lee “unable to process emotions
… warrant[ed] more extensive discussion,” Schwarzenegger declined to enter that discussion and
instead concluded that Beardslee’s apparently intact cognition answered the inquiry.271 Though
“many observers ha[d] reported that Beardslee” had “a flattened affect for much of his life” and
had argued that “this lack of emotion is a symptom and byproduct of his mental deficiency,”
Schwarzenegger concluded that the fact that “Beardslee had a flat affect … does not have
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According to Dr. Rubin Gur, damage to portions of Beardslee’s right-hemisphere prefrontal cortex significantly
impaired his “ability to inhibit responses to cognitive and emotional stimuli,” thus damaging his ability to plan and
engage in “reasoned, purposeful, self-controlled goal-directed behavior.” See Gur Declaration, supra note 278, at 3
¶8. See also Dean E. Murphy, Brain Damage Is Cited in Plea for Killer’s Life, N.Y. TIMES A14 (Jan. 18, 2005)
(quoting Dr. Gur as testifying at clemency hearing, “He couldn’t really understand people’s emotions. He couldn’t
know himself how to behave, so he would rely on others to interpret things for him. He would mimic people’s
behavior.”). Beardslee’s “impairments in the areas of emotional processing” were consistent with his “stiff,
emotionally constricted, relatively flat affect” and “poor ability to decipher emotional cues.” Gur Declaration, supra
note 278, at 3 ¶8.
A very significant limitation on Dr. Gur’s analysis was that he had not personally examined Beardslee, nor
had he access to any brain scans; he presented what he called a “behavioral image” of Beardslee’s brain, a
computer-generated schematic representation of clinical data that essentially hypothesized what the brain probably
looked like. See id. at ¶6. Therefore, one of the requests put forth by Beardslee’s lawyers was that the execution be
stayed for the purpose of obtaining actual brain scans. That request was denied. In contrast, in Jane’s case the
ability of the defense to obtain sophisticated brain-scanning technology yielded compelling evidence of her brain
damage and its precise location.
270
Letter of James P. Fox et al. to Governor Schwarzenegger 7-8, 12 (dated Jan. 7, 2005). The prosecutor in Jane’s
case also repeatedly denied that she could be significantly brain-damaged, primarily because of her intact
intelligence.
271
Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger, Statement of Decision: Request for Clemency by Mr. Donald J. Beardslee 3
(dated Jan. 18, 2005).
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persuasive value” showing that “lacked capacity to make reasoned decisions.”272 Beardslee was
executed.273
In both the Beardslee and Shytle cases, then, legal decision-makers held that evidence of
cognitive function simply overrides evidence of emotional dysfunction. The fact that these states
of being can coexist and, further, that emotional dysfunction can correlate with and signal
rational decision-making deficits even where cognition is intact, was simply not considered
credible. Nor did the decision-makers in those cases appear to regard as important the fact that
persons with profoundly impaired emotional function might be incapable of formulating the selfprotective motivation that would animate active participation in their defense, including
cooperation with counsel. In contrast, in Jane’s case an examiner took such emotional
impairments seriously, in conjunction with evidence of other (and arguably more cognitive)
impairment, and determined her to be adjudicatively incompetent. This juxtaposition, paralleling
that of the courts’ and examiners’ varying treatment of depression, indicates that current theory
and practice fail to reflect a consistent and sophisticated understanding of emotion’s influence on
rational decision-making.
III.

Measurement and Policy Considerations

Thus far, this Article has argued that both cognition and emotion are integral to the
rational decision-making on which adjudicative competence depends. It has urged that
decisional competence be recognized as key, that examiners and courts—whose interdependent
efforts are vital to determinations of adjudicative competence—undertake any given competence

272

Id. at 3-4.
Moreover, the Governor’s decision, by relying on the assessment that Beardslee’s impairments did not prevent
him from knowing right from wrong, see id. at 5, further reflects a fundamental confusion between the legal
standards governing clemency and insanity, in a way that directly parallels the persistent confusion between
competence and insanity. This parallel suggests that decision-makers looking to competence might similarly make
decisions based on the incorrect standard.
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determination by reference to the component parts of rational decision-making, and that such
examination articulate and take seriously the effects of both thought disorder and emotional
disorder, particularly where the latter is not adequately captured by a cognitive focus. It has
argued specifically that courts and examiners should consider whether clinical depression
(whether unipolar or bipolar) has impaired substantially a defendant’s perception, appreciation,
and ability to choose, and that the emotional deficits attending certain forms of brain damage
should be regarded as important concomitants of impaired capacity for reasoning and choice. It
is worth asking, though, whether this proposal is amenable to implementation thatwould further
the goals of adjudicative competence doctrine. This Part addresses those concerns.
The question of whether “emotional competence” is amenable to accurate, consistent
definition and measurement is no small matter. This difficulty is not unique to emotional
considerations; because of the open-textured nature of the construct, it inures to all attempts to
define and measure competence.274 The real question, then, is whether there is something about
emotional disorder that makes it so different from cognitive disorder as to prevent it from being
articulated, measured, and considered as part of the legal test for adjudicative competence.
While there is good reason to raise this question, it should be answered in the negative.
One prominent competence theorist, Paul Appelbaum, raised just this question within the
context of a parallel debate over capacity to consent to medical treatment.275 Appelbaum agreed
that “disturbing questions” had been raised “about the lack of attention to emotional issues in
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See ROESCH & GOLDING, supra note 6, at 101 (“If competency is reduced to a construct, and if it cannot be
reduced to a particular operational definition, and if even court decisions themselves are (more or less) fallible, then
how can one proceed to improve the reliability and validity of assessment procedures used (or to be developed) in its
determination?”).
275
See Appelbaum, supra note 33, at 378.
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competence assessment.”276 He cautioned, however, that before incorporating emotional
considerations we ought to satisfy ourselves of the existence of a substantial target population
whose incompetence is not likely to be captured by more traditional cognitive measures, as well
as of the feasibility of measuring such dysfunction. Perhaps, he argued, the historical focus on
cognition at emotion’s expense is warranted if it reflects “the experience of courts with regard to
the major causes of decision-making incapacity.”277 Thus, he asserted, “it is imperative to know
before beginning that the game is worth the candle.”278 Appelbaum’s concerns, which have not
to date been followed up within the treatment-consent literature,279 are well-placed, though he
almost certainly was wrong that historical neglect of emotion’s role might reflect the wisdom of
experience. Such neglect is entirely consistent with and reflective of the historical disregard of
emotional considerations that is now under sustained attack.280 And if we look beyond that
neglectful pedigree, the outlook is hopeful.
The search for“rational” cognition is , after all, not so very different from the search for
“rational” emotion; as LeDoux has pointed out, “cognition is not as logical as it was once
thought and emotions are not so illogical,”281 and as to both we operate with reference not to an
ideal but to a rough account of the normal.282 Thinking and reasoning are not “inherently
rational, optimal, desirable, or even smart. A thorough history of human thinking will include
quite a few chapters on stupidity.”283 And as abundant research on bounded rationality284 has
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Appelbaum, supra note 33, at 378, 382-84 (this is because emotion signals value and assists in formulation of
goals, and as brain-damage research suggests a strong link between emotion and reasoning (citing BECKY COX
WHITE, COMPETENCE TO CONSENT 131, 137 (1994), and DAMASIO, DESCARTES’ ERROR, supra note 146, at 38)).
277
Appelbaum, supra note 33, at 385.
278
Id.
279
These questions represent a rich site for potential future research, ideally as a collaborative effort between
scientists and legal scholars.
280
See Part II.B.2., supra.
281
LEDOUX, supra note 1, at 35.
282
Thanks to Liam Murphy for clarifying this point.
283
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confirmed, people consistently exhibit normatively non-rational processes when forming
judgments and making decisions.285 While reliance on cognitive heuristics and biases286 is in
one sense irrational, it cannot be the sort of irrationality about which adjudicative competence is
concerned, if for no other reason than that is fartoo common. 287 Similarly, the fact that most
people are of only average intelligence and routinely make foolish choices cannot be legally
significant. But by buying into the adjudicative competence requirement, we necessarily assume
that we can somehow, and with some level of consistency, tell the difference between everyday
irrationality and the competence-threatening sort.288
Even when considering only cognitive function this is often far from an easy call, as
discussion of the thought-disorder cases reveals. But the quest for such rationality is
significantly furthered by the decision-makingapproach argued here. Indeed, that approach is
largely reflected in the forensic assessment instrument created by the MacArthur team.289 More
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widespread use of that instrument, the MacCAT-CA, would promote clarity and consistency, at
least in terms of assessing cognitive disorder. Encouragingclose articulation of the necessary
steps of decision-making—including by use of the MacCAT-CA—should not, though, be read to
imply that each step must be ideally executed for the entire process to be deemed minimally
rational.
A similar analysis pertains to emotional disorder. Though this Article has explained how
a dearth or surfeit of particular emotions, a general lack of emotional capacity, or lack of
emotional balance can threaten competence, that does not signify that a defendant must have
optimal emotional health to be competent, just as she is not required to display above-average
intelligence and sharp, non-biased reasoning skills.290 Criminal defendants often will present
with emotional disturbances, only a small subset of which might threaten competence.291
Defendants may well have had mood disorders and emotional problems before committing the
conduct of which they are accused; the offense conduct might have been motivated by emotional
disturbance or itself may have caused trauma; and the prospect of conviction and punishment
may trigger significant stress and suffering.292 While these factors might matter to adjudicative
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incompetence.”).

67

Emotional Competence, Rational Understanding, and the Criminal Defendant
competence in any given instance, they might not, though a prudent approach would regard
many such emotional disturbances as warranting further examination. What we are concerned
about is the presentation of extreme disorders that can be shown to seriously disrupt one or more
identifiable stages of minimally stable, self-protective decision-making processes.
In this regard, examination of competence-threatening emotional disorder may not be on
quiteas solid a footing as a cognitive approach . However, it still falls well within acceptable
limits. An example is illustrative. Consider the MacCAT-CA, which, as “primarily a cognitive
assessment tool,”293 is not well- suited to an assessment of emotion’s role. For example, it
contains only one indirect measure of affect, the “appreciation subscale,” but that subscale is not
specifically directed to the emotional component of appreciation, but rather to its thoughtdisorder iteration.294 Moreover, the understanding and reasoning portions of the MacCAT-CA
rely on the defendant’s responses to a hypothetical incident, which by reason of being “one step
removed from the defendant’s actual case”295 may be particularly ill-suited to capturing “Gage
matrix” dysfunction, in which intact laboratory response to hypotheticals stands in contrast to
real-life failure.296 These limitations suggest that the MacCAT-CA will be of little use in cases
of emotional dysfunction. But such a conclusion would be overstated. While a new instrument
could be developed to incorporate the types of emotional considerations urged here, assessment
of emotional competence need not await such a test. No forensic assessment instrument is
293
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intended to stand alone, but instead is meant to be considered as part of a holistic evaluation
including clinical observation, review of the defendant’s medical and psychiatric history,
interviews with those in a position to shed light on her behavior, and evaluation of the particular
issues and demands at play in the specific case.297 Thus, the MacCAT-CA could be
supplemented with a more emotion-focused inquiry were the examiner, defense attorney,
prosecutor, or judge to suspect a relevant emotional disorder.
At least with regard to depression, such an examination is likely to be fruitful. Clinical
depression is a relatively well-understood disease affecting a large number of persons.298 While
its definition and diagnosis always will be subject to meaningful debate, this is equally true of
schizophrenia and other psychotic disorders. Moreover, as the cases demonstrate, the possible
incompetence of such persons is not always captured by cognitive tests. Capturing such
impairments will depend on whether emotional factors are explicitly considered relevant to the
legal standard. What is lacking is not a strong empirical foundation for depression diagnoses; it
is, rather, a strong theoretical foundation within law, such as that offered herein, affirming that
such depression might matter to competence, and explaining how. If courts direct examiners to
make such assessments, those examiners have ready access to the diagnostic tools to comply.
The prognosis for assessment of “Gage matrix” disorder is more mixed. While it now
appears clear that emotional capacity and reasoning decline together in persons with specific
forms of frontal damage, causation remains unclear. Though causation is a highly contested
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issue in the study of psychotic and mood disorders as well, the noveltyof the emerging brain
research warrants particular caution when deciding whether to attribute to it real legal
significance.299 It is also difficult to know how many people, let alone how many criminal
defendants, might be affected by such brain damage. There is reason to believe they may be
overrepresented in the defendant population.300 It has been suggested, too, that a large
percentage of death-row inmates suffer from frontal lobe damage,301 and at least some of those
may well display such disorder. But detection issues loom large. The emotional flatness
characteristic of “Gage matrix” disorder could mimic the flat affect displayed by those
considered “psychopaths” or even those attempting, for reasons of ego maintenance or selfprotection, to project a tough image.302 Because of the high cost and uncertain payoff of brain
imaging, in addition to privacy concerns, it would be neither feasible or desirable to image all
defendants’ (or even all capital defendants’) brains, absent other strong indicators of
incompetence or brain injury.
Still, “Gage matrix” disorder should be allowed to inform competence assessment. In
cases like Jane’s, where a strange emotional profile—particularly one incorporating highly
299
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unusual affective flatness and inability to “read” the emotional signals of others—presents
together with a history of evidently self-destructive behaviors, there is good reason to suspect
such disorder. Because cognition tends to remain intact in such persons, attention to the
emotional aspect will matter, because without it we are left with a purely outcome-driven
inquiry: we think the defendant may be incompetent because of the terrible choices she has
displayed in life. Such an assessment will fall far short of that required to trigger an inquiry or
justify an incompetence finding, and cognitive tests likely will reveal nothing unusual.
Following up on the suspicion created by the addition of apparent emotional disorder, then,
generally by neurological exam and brain imaging, may bring very important information to the
table. The current state of scientific knowledge permits a conclusion that such a profile is
underlain by a defective decision-making process, although we may not yet know precisely why;
and the high correlation of emotion and reasoning defects suggests that the latter are both
substantial and not something over which the defendant has control. Thus, even under the most
cautious approach, presentation of such a profile should raise a bona fide doubt as to competence
sufficient to warrant more searching inquiry.303 Whether any resulting evidence of brain damage
should be considered to establish Dusky incompetence will be a harder call, highly dependent on
the exact nature of the damage and the extent to which medical experts and courtsare able to
articulate its effect on the defendant’s ability to make sound, self-protective decisions in the
context of her case.304 Given the limitations of existing standardized tests such a determination
almost certainly will require creative solutions, potentially including administration of the type
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of experimental gambling tasks used by Damasio in his research,305 observation of the defendant
in actual decision-making situations, and interviews of persons who have observed her real-life
decision-makingprocess es.
Even once we have satisfied ourselves that we can incorporate emotional evaluation into
competence determinations, we still must ask ourselves if we should. It is possible that fewer
defendants will be deemed incompetent under the proposed approach, because the effort might
lead examiners away from simplistic determinations—for example, those that de facto equate
psychosis with incompetence—but it seems more likely to result in more—potentially many
more—incompetence determinations, particularly of the severely depressed.306 Because of the
doctrine’s delicate balancing act between competing values, undue expansion of the test
threatens to both impair defendants’ autonomy and frustrate the state’s interest in public safety
and law enforcement.
Structural features of the competence determination, however, largely guard against any
serious threat to autonomy and public safety. In nearly every case, the consequence of an
incompetence determination is not termination of criminal proceedings: it is a delay in
proceedings while the defendant is evaluated and treated.307 Extensive delay in proceedings
surely can weaken a prosecution case, but confinement for restoration of competence may not
continue indefinitely and must be justified by treatment progress, creating incentives for timely
resolution. Depression, even severe depression incorporating elements of thought disorder, often
305
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is amenable to treatment, particularly with medication308—and in very extreme cases medical
staff may be permitted to administer such medication involuntarily.309 The period of evaluation
and treatment also is useful for detecting malingering.310 Further, even if the interest in
enforcing criminal law never is vindicated, the defendant might still be incapacitated, as should
she be incapable of competence restoration but dangerous to herself or others she will be subject
to civil commitment proceedings.311 And while the potential for encroachment on autonomy is
real, most defendants (particularly those with viable defenses) who truly are capable of
autonomous decision-making have strong incentives to try and prove that they have been
wrongly identified as incompetent, to avoid both the stigma of involuntary mental health
treatment and the possibility of long-term confinement with no opportunity for a determination
of guilt or innocence.312
Further, to the extent that some number of defendants might escape both prosecution and
confinement, that is an acceptable (if potentially painful) price to pay.313 This is particularly
relevant to disposition of brain-damaged defendants who, like Jane, likely will never get better.
Though it is possible that medical experts might identify strategies to improve such defendants’
competence, it is prudent to assume that most will be adjudicatively incompetent for life. The
same result may obtain with regard to that percentage of the severely depressed whose disease
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defies treatment.314 Should such defendants be neither dangerous nor otherwise subject to civil
commitment, she may in fact go permanently “unwhipped of justice.”315 But the number of such
defendants is likely to be relatively small; they will by definition not present an imminent danger
to public safety; and the ill effects of their disorders may be effectively cabined by surrogate
decision-making, for example, by appointment of guardians to handle their financial affairs.
Though not without cost, such a result is far less offensive to the system of criminal justice than
the trial of an incompetent person in contravention of her fundamental constitutional rights.316
Conclusion
This Article has proposed a thinking-and-feeling conception of the Dusky requirement of
rational understanding. To implement this conception, it is vital that courts, examiners, and legal
scholars join forensic theorists in recognizing the centrality of decisional competence. Because
most courts and examiners do not explicitly so frame their inquiry, they deprive themselves of
transparent access to decision-making theory’s large and useful trove of substantive knowledge
and analytical tools. Further, courts, examiners, and legal theorists must join the contemporary
mind sciences in recognizing that emotion is both deeply intertwined with the mechanisms of
cognition and of independent significance within rational human decision-making. Looking for
and describing the specific cognitive and affective substrates of defendants’ decision-making
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processes provides a language and methodology that will expose the theoretical and practical
underpinnings of competence determinations.317
But transparency is not the only virtue. The advocated approach also will uncover certain
threats to competence that simply would not be noticed, or regarded as important, under a more
simplistic or purely cognitive approach. If, for example, we are unaware that inability to
perceive and process emotional information is highly correlated with defective reasoning under
conditions of personal risk, a defendant’s deficits in the former domain— even if proven—lack
any logical hook into tests of competence. And if we lack understanding of emotion’s role in
appraisal, appreciation, and choice, we not only cannot articulate why it is that a profoundly
depressed person might be incapable of formulating and communicating a sound, stable, selfprotective choice, we cannot voice any theory under which that phenomenon might matter.
Under the approach advocated here, evidence of cognitive function never should be allowed
simply to trump evidence of emotional dysfunction; nor should the converse be true.
Adjudicative competence doctrine and practice should strive, rather, to reflect “the harmonious
integration of reason and passion in the brain.”318
This is not to say that the adjudicative competence conundrum can be solved for once and
for all by reference to the insights of the mind sciences. 319 Nor, despite significant advances in
our understanding of human decision-making, may we reasonably expect to discover and define
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some stable conception of rationality.320 Rationality will, like competence, always retain the
somewhat elusive quality of an idea. Shifting the inquiry away from a general search for
“rationality,” however, and toward a more finely-grained search for rational decision-making
processes by reference to both cognitive and emotional influences, is one way out of the “black
hole” into which courts sometimes feel themselves drawn.321 This approach is transparent,
theoretically defensible, and amenable to concrete implementation. It offers our best hope for
giving meaning to “rational understanding.”
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